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I. INTRODUCTION
To quote Michael Howard, "In 1989, while the nations of
Western Europe celebrated the bicentenary of the French
Revolution, the nations of Eastern Europe reenacted it."
The reference to these two events as analogous are a cause
of great concern, however, as the enthusiasm and joy
experienced by the French in 1789 was shortlived as the wars
that followed devestated the European continent. As
troubling as the outbreak of a series of analogous wars in
Eastern Europe may seem, there are other analogies that are
just as worrisome to both the newly formed democracies of
Eastern Europe and the Western democratic nations.
In 1848 conservative monarchies throughout Europe were
overthrown as revolutionary upheaval in France quickly
spread across Europe to Budapest, Vienna, Berlin, Milan and
Prague. These dynastic collapses created a huge power
vacuum throughout Europe, and left the new inexperienced
liberal leaders with the task of transforming abstract
political ideals into reality. The inability of the new
leaders to accomplish this task resulted in the resurgence
of conservative reactionaries, and led one leading English
historian to note that the revolution "...exhausted itself
without achieving concrete results: it left its imprint only
in the realm of ideas."
Although argument by analogy is dangerous and can often
be misleading, the events of 1789 and 1848 illustrate the
perils that revolutionary change poses to the international
system. The French Revolution destroyed the relative peace
and tranquility of the eighteenth century European order and
plunged the continent into an unprecedented period of
warfare. Similiarly, the revolutions of 1848 undermined the
stability on the European continent established by the
Congress of Vienna and ushered in a new and more dangerous
period as the European states became increasingly
nat ionali st icly oriented. But what factors and forces
emerged from these revolutions that created instability in
the international system? Perhaps more importantly, are
these factors and forces present following the revolutions
of 1989, and what does this indicate about the stability of
the evolving international system?
This thesis has two purposes. First, to determine the
factors and forces that emerged from the post revolutionary
periods of 1789 and 1848 that tended to create instability
in the international system. Second, to determine if these
same factors and forces are present following the
revolutions of 1989, and to assess their likely impact on
the stability of the international system.
"Michael Howard, "The Springtime of Nations," Foreign
Affairs , Vol. 69 No. 1 (1990), 17.




(London: Oxford University Fress, 1946), 31
II. THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
The events that took place in Europe during the
eighteenth century have had a lasting impact on the
evolution of the international system. Although at the
beginning of the century the framework of European diplomacy
was well established, by the eve of the French Revolution
this framework had been vastly expanded to the east with the
emergence of the great powers of Prussia and Russia. The
emergence of Prussia and Russia resulted in the
establishment of a true multipolar balance of power system
which covered the entire continent, and because of the
competition between the European powers for colonies
overseas, the system could in a limited sense be described
as global. The emergence of this multipolar balance of
power system substantially diluted the bipolar ideological
struggle that had developed between the French continental
world and the British island world during the seventeenth
century, and resulted in the emergence of a number of
critical factors that helped to promote international
stability in the eighteenth century. The events that led to
the development of this stable system will now be examined
with the ultimate purpose to help understand if the events
of the early 1990s are tending toward stability or
instability in Europe.
A. THE EMERGENCE OF THE BALANCE OF POWER
The Treaties of Utrecht (April 1713), Rastatt (March
1714) and Baden (September 1714) brought an end to the War
of the Spanish Succession that had lasted from 1701 to 1714
and attempted to establish a balance of pover and an
equilibrium of forces in Western Europe. These treaties
ended the fighting and no major war developed until 1740
when conflict erupted over the Austrian succession. This
relatively quiet period was more the result of the events
following the negotiations of the treaties and the general
level of exhaustion experienced by the major powers from the
war, however, than the result of any diplomatic brilliance
in the treaties. Despite this fact, this series of treaties
played an important role in both the conduct of
international relations and in the formation of the
international system during the first half of the eighteenth
century
.
The peace treaties of 1713-14 reestablished the
legitimacy of the independent dynastic state recognized by
the Treaty of Westphalia. The dreams of France's Louis XIV
to be chosen Holy Roman Emperor, unite the Kingdoms of Spain
and France, and establish an era of French preponderance on
the continent had been shattered. The peace treaties
successfully divided the territories of the Spanish
Habsburgs and put an end to any serious effort to unify all
of Europe under a single authority. Thus, despite the fact
that the treaties were largely overcome by events, these
peace treaties played an important role in the development
of the international system because they reinforced both the
legitimacy of the dynastic rulers established by the Treaty
of Westphalia and the legitimacy of the concept of
independent dynastic states. The legitimacy of these
concepts would eventually lead to the development of a
multipolar system in Europe, although in the immediate
aftermath of the var the primary concern was to restrain
future universal pretensions of France.
Following the Treaty of Utrecht it appeared that efforts
to restrain France would result in the European powers
reforming alliances along traditional bipolar lines with
England, Austria and the Dutch opposing France, which was
sometimes supported by Spain and some of the German states.
This tendency was reinforced when soon after the conclusion
of the treaty, Louis XIV seemed determined to evade the
terms which stipulated the demolition of Dunkirk as a naval
base. The fear of renewed French aggression allowed
England, Austria and the Netherlands to set aside
differences that had emerged between them during the war and
unite to restrain France.
To restrict France the allies established a series of
barriers along the frontiers of France by setting up neutral
buffer states in Germany, Italy and the Low Countries. The
Barrier Treaty was concluded in November 1715, and although
these small neutral states vere not strong enough to act
independently, with allied support, particularly from
England, these small states could be used to check any
renewed French aggression. Additionally, England also
envisioned using these states as a counterbalance to any
expansionist desires of the Austrian emperor.
Although it appeared that vith the reformation of
European alliances along traditional lines that stability
would be brought to Europe, even before the completion of
the Barrier Treaty uncertainty began to arise about the
succession of the rulers in England and France. Since
disputes over the legitimacy of any major ruler had proved
to be destabilizing to the European balance of power, the
precarious positions of both the rulers of England and
France would have to be solidified before stability could be
achieved
.
Internal instability was particularly troublesome in
France following the death of Louis XIV in September 1715,
which left Louis XV, a sick and fragile boy of five, the
ascendant to the throne. Had Louis XV died, the only
remaining legitimate male descendents of Louis XIV would
have been the Spanish Bourbons, but they were barred from
o
the French throne by the Treaty of Utrecht, which
established the Duke of Orleans as the legal heir to Louis
XV. Since the Duke of Orleans and the Spanish Bourbon King
Philip V were bitter personal enemies, the death of Louis XV
would have most likely resulted in a war over the French
successi on
.
The Du^e of Orleans, who held the title of regent, had
consolidated his position in France, although his strength
was constantly challenged by many factions of the "old
guard" of the French court who favored Philip V and desired
a closer friendship between France and Spain. To counter
the possibility of Spanish support for the old guard
resulting in a war of succession, the regent hoped to entice
another power to give him friendly support. The unlikely
recipient of French diplomatic efforts was England, where
peculiar domestic conditions led France to believe that
?England would be willing to form an alliance.'
In England, King George I, who had previously held the
position of the Elector of Hanover prior to succeeding Queen
Anne on 1 August 1714, faced an internal challenge from the
Jacobite rising of 1715. The rising attempted to restore
the catholic Stuart, James III, to the English throne. The
rising collapsed in early 1716, mainly because James III was
a true catholic and refused to change his religion to claim
the throne. Despite this failure, James III remained a
serious threat to George I, and the possibility remained
that James III might one day change his faith and thereby
increase his prospects for claiming the throne. As a result
of this constant menace, George I was continuously
surrounded by an insecure domestic situation.
Although it is doubtful that George's internal situation
would have resulted in England entering into an alliance
with France, when combined with the events which were taking
place in Northern Europe as the second Northern War raged on
in the fall of 1716, the English became more inclined to
reach an agreement with France. Feter the Great of Russia
had quartered his troops in Mecklenburg and George I
perceived this as a threat to the interests of Hannover.
George I wanted to remove this threat as well as gain
Swedish territory on the southern coast of the Baltic, and
as a result George I was ready to reach an agreement with
France because of France's strong traditional influence in
Sweden. The alliance between England and France was signed
in October of 1716, and was later expanded to include the
Dutch on A January 1717. 6
The Anglo-French alliance proved to be a stabilizing
factor in early eighteenth century Europe. The two powers
were able to bring an end to Spain's expansionist desires in
Italy during the war of 1719, and French diplomacy was
instrumental in ending the Northern War with the Treaty of
Nystadt in September 1721. Although Russia emerged as the
true victor from the Northern War, and Russia's emergence as
a great power is most often attributed to the successes of
Peter the Great, Russia's influence in international affairs
was limited during the next two decades by the series of
short reigns (four successions in sixteen years) of its
rulers. The absence of Russian influence during this period
allowed the Anglo-French alliance to preserve the peace
relatively effectively until the mid 1730s, when a
combination of events significantly altered the continental
situation and resulted in the true emergence of Russia and
Prussia as great powers. The result of these events would
be to establish a true multipolar system which covered the
entire European continent.
B. THE WAR OF THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION
Beginning in the early 1730s frictions developed among
the colonial powers of England, Spain and France regarding
trade. These frictions were the result of an inept Spanish
imperial policy which allowed Spanish colonies to trade only
with Spain. Because Spain and France had already
established strong trading ties between them, this policy
greatly benefited France as Spain was often times just an
intermediate stop for French goods on their way to the
colonies. As a result, prior to the outbreak of the war
between England and Spain in October 1739, English trade had
remained almost stationary while French trade rapidly
increased, particularly in the Spanish markets. The large
demand for goods of the Spanish colonies, however, was much
greater than Spain, despite being aided by France, could
supply. These shortages were made up through illicit trade,
particularly with the English who had become more
10
industrialized and vere eager to exploit new markets.
Although the Spanish government vas moderately tolerant of
English illicit trade, the Spanish colonial governors and
merchants became particularly alarmed as their monopoly
trade rights vere circumvented. As a result the Spanish
governors vere able to induce their colonists to fit out
coastguard ships in an attempt to stop the illicit trade.
Although these coastguard ships vere not very effective, in
1737 they successfully seized about a dozen English
v • 8ships
.
The tensions caused by the seizure of the ships in the
West Indies vere intensified by the charges of barbarous
conduct on the part of both the Spanish colonial coastguards
personnel and the English smugglers. The Spanish government
sought to avoid conflict with England, however, and adopted
a conciliatory attitude when England brought its complaints
to the Spanish government over the seizure of its ships.
According to the Spanish government, "...even if some
suspicion of illicit trade remains, the prevention of
illicit trade should never make Spanish officials lose sight
of the need of good harmony vith the other povers of
qEurope .
"
The Spanish attempt to smooth over the situation,
hovever, vas not successful. British public opinion had
become increasingly anti-Spanish, and visions of conquest of
vealthy Spanish colonies resulted in many Englishmen
11
becoming anxious for war with Spain. Disputes over the
boundaries of British Georgia and Spanish Florida only
served to exacerbate the situation. Finally, the weakness
and division within the Eritish cabinet made it almost
impossible for the government to combat popular sentiment,
and as a result Spain and England were at war in October
1739.
The conflict that developed between England and Spain
undermined the Anglo-French alliance that had maintained the
balance in Europe. Although the French had few smugglers
involved in the Kest Indies, over one-half of all the
commodities carried by the Spanish galleons to the Spanish
colonies came from France. France therefore had a powerful
motive to support Spain to ensure the future strength of its
export commodities. In August 1740 France sent two battle
squadrons to the West Indies to support the Spanish.
Before the French could join the war against England,
however, the death of the Emperor Charles VI and the
instabilities that emerged in Austria and Central Europe
forced France to recall its squadrons in order to deal with
these continental complications.
The war that developed over the Austrian succession was
in some ways surprising. Although Sardinia and Spain
desired the opportunity to obtain additional possessions in
northern Italy at Austria's expense, the positions that the
great powers found themselves in had a moderating influence
12
on the continental situation. England and Spain vere at
war, and the French vere on the verge of joining the clash
against England, and therefore none of these parties desired
any continental complications. Although Bavaria refused to
recognize Maria Theresa as the Austrian heir, Bavaria did
not pose a threat due to its general lack of resources.
Finally, Russia was faced with internal difficulties, and
with tensions rising with Sweden, Russia did not overly
concern itself with affairs in Central Europe.
The surprising assault upon Austria came from Prussia.
The young Frederick II clearly realized the geopolitical
importance of the Habsburg province of Silesia for Prussian
power. The annexation of Silesia would not only provide an
immensly wealthy province, but also weaken the Elector of
Saxony by placing Prussian territory between his German
lands and Polish kingdom. Furthermore, Frederick's
masterful assessment of the strategic situation that had
developed in central Europe provided the perfect framework
for Prussia to aggrandize itself at Austria's expense. In
December 1740, Prussia invaded Silesia, starting a conflict
that would soon expand to cover the entire continent.
French policy in the spring of 1741 was the key to
events on the continent. Although Cardinal Fleury desired
to maintain French neutrality in order to be able to
concentrate French efforts on the struggle with England, he
was unable to restrain the nobility that possessed a long
13
ant i -Kabsburg tradition. The traditional ant i -Habsburg
sentiments were intensified in March 1741 when the French
envoy Marshal de Belleises, who was related by marriage to
Charles Albert of Bavaria, traveled to the German states to
obtain support for Charles Albert's candidacy for the vacant
imperial title. Belleisle converted this mission into one
of constructing an ant i-Habsburg coalition in Germany
designed to dismember the Habsburg states, a policy strongly
supported by the French nobility.
French ambitions agains 4- Austria alarmed England's
George II about the safety of his German Electorate of
Hanover. In July George II came to an understanding with
his enemies, and without consulting his ministers in London,
signed an agreement guaranteeing Hanover's neutrality. With
England's neutrality secured, French and Bavarian troops
invaded Bohemia in October. The neutrality of Hanover vas
very unpopular in England, vhich vas seen as allowing
England's traditional enemy France to make another attempt
at continental hegemony. This contributed to the fall of
the ministry of Walpole, and resulted in England's foreign
policy being taken over by Lord Carteret, the new secretary
of the Northern Department
.
Carteret successfully pressured Maria Theresa to sign
the Preliminaries of Breslau in June 1742 to make peace with
Prussia in order to be able to concentrate English and
Austrian efforts against France. This agreement ended the
14
Austro-Frussian var and conceded Silesia to Frederick. In
return for Austria's peace settlement with Prussia, the
English offered Maria Theresa additional subsidies and
troops to counter the French threat. Although Austria
resented English demands regarding the concession of Silesia
to Prussia, it was the events that took place in Italy that
laid the foundations for the diplomatic revolution that
would occur following the end of the war.
The struggle that developed in Italy was largely between
the Austrians and the Spanish. Spain hoped to gain the
Austrian domain of Milanese and Tuscany, however, any
struggle between these two in Italy could be substantially
influenced by Charles Emmanuel, king of Sardinia-Piedmont.
Sardinia, which controlled the Alpine passes, could take
advantage of these mountains to oppose any invasion of
Italy. As a result, both Spain and Austria attempted to
win Charles Emmanuel's support by promising territorial
concessions. Charles Emmanuel realized, however, that
Spanish concessions were contingent upon Spanish success,
while Austria already possessed territories that could be
exchanged for Sardinian support. Maria Theresa realized
this as well, and was therefore only willing to offer
minimal concessions to ensure his support. Maria Theresa's
position was undermined, however, by Carteret, who insisted
that substantial territorial concessions be granted
immediately in exchange for Sardinia's support. Once again
15
Carteret prevailed and coerced Maria Theresa to conclude the
Treaty of Worms on 13 September 1743. The treaty
surrendered a large portion of Lombardy and a section of
Piacenza in exchange for a Sardinian army of 45,000 troops
and vague English promises of territorial compensations once
1 5
victory in Italy had been achieved. The concessions
forced upon Austria were deeply resented, and only the
threat to Austrian territory by the French prevented the
Anglo-Austrian coalition from falling apart.
While the Treaty of Worms served to create a rift in the
Anglo-Austrian alliance, it served to unite Austria's
antagonists. The treaty provoked France to secure a Spanish
alliance in October 17^3 with the Treaty of
Fontainbleau , and in March 1744 the French declared war
on England and Hanover, followed in May by a declaration of
war on Austria and the invasion of the Netherlands.
Additionally, because the Treaty of Worms guaranteed the
enforcement of the Pragmatic Sanction but made no mention of
the surrender of Silesia to Prussia, Frederick signed a nev;
treaty with France in June 1744, followed shortly thereafter
i 7by the Prussian invasion of Bohemia.
The offensive against Austria failed however when
cooperation between the French, Spanish and Prussians broke
down over a series of disputes regarding the failure of the
Franco-Spanish naval operations off of Toulon in February
1744. Similarly, the failure of the French army to engage
16
the retreating Austrian army in Alsace during the Austrian
invasion of France in 17^4 was also a source of conflict.
The retreat of the Austrian army intact resulted in
Frederick's army in Eohemia facing the main Austrian army,
which forced Frederick's retreat back to Silesia by the end
of 1744. Austrian attempts to regain Silesia were
defeated by Frederick's masterful military victories at
Hohenf r iedberg and Soor , and the Frussian victory at
Kesseldorf, placing Frederick in control of Saxony.
The combination of Frederick's victory in Saxony,
threats of withdrawal of British subsidies if the war with
Prussia was not concluded, and the rejection of Austrian
peace proposals to France resulted in the Treaty of Dresden
Of)
which was signed in December 1745. The Treaty of
Dresden ended the second Austro-Prussian conflict and firmly
established Prussia's control over Silesia Although the
war would continue for another three years with fighting in
Italy and the Netherlands between England, Austria and the
United Provinces against the French and Spanish, the
conflict in Germany was over.
The fighting in Italy dissipated quickly as cooperation
between France and Spain and between Austria and Sardinia
deteriorated. In the Netherlands, French victories at
Lauffeldt and the capture of the fortress Bergen-op-Zoom
raised the chances for French success. However, the
combination of French war weariness and the hiring of
17
Russian troops by Austria, which had nov become possible due
to the settlement of the Swedish-Russian conflict, resulted
in the opening of the Conference of Aix-la-Chapelle in early
1748.
With the exception of Prussia's annexation of Silesia,
the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle concluded in October 1748
returned Europe to the status quo ante bellum. Any
territorial gains achieved by one of the great powers was
generally offset by reciprocal compensations elsewhere.
Although geographically Europe had only been marginally
altered, the War of the Austrian Succession had a
significant impact on the development of the international
system and the balance of power on the European continent
Russia, which had defeated Sweden, conquered Finland, and
maintained a protectorate over Poland; and Prussia, which
had gained the geographically important and wealthy province
of Silesia, had emerged as true great powers. Austria,
though stung by its lose of Silesia to Prussia was still
perhaps the strongest power in Central Europe. Spain's
strength and prestige continued to decline, and England and
France had "...gained nothing but the experience of each
other's strength and power." The multipolar system
represented by these five powers was thus well balanced as
all the powers possessed relatively equal strength.
Maintaining the balance of this international system
dominated European diplomacy until the end of World War I.
18
C. THE DIPLOMATIC REVOLUTION OF 1755
The antagonisms that developed between the alliances
during the War of the Austrian Succession, coupled with the
emergence of Prussian and Russia as great powers, and the
continued antagonisms that existed between France and
England and between Prussia and Austria resulted in a
multipolar system that was in a state of flux. England
sought to concentrate its efforts against the colonial
challenge of France while remaining detached from
continental entanglements, although the threat to Hanover
from Prussia could not be overlooked. Austria desired to
regain the territory it lost to Prussia, but realized that
English support for Austria's ambitions was negligible.
Prussia was fearful of attack from both Austria and Russia,
and the French difficulties in countering the English naval
threat made Frederick question the likelihood of French
support against attempts to destroy Prussia
.
The increased threat of war that developed between
England and France in late 1754 provided the event that
allowed a re-alignment of traditional European alliances.
England's attempts to secure Austria's support for the
defense of Hanover were not well received. Under the
guidance of Chancellor Kaunitz, Austria stated that it would
only provide protection of Hanover if England agreed to
support an Austro-Russian offensive plan for the destruction
of Prussia. Austria had no intention of subordinating
19
its goal of the destruction of Prussia to England's
continental interests. The lack of Austrian support
resulted in England signing the Convention of St. Petersberg
with Russia in September 1755. In exchange for 500,000
pounds sterling annually, Russia would provide 55,000 troops
quartered in Livonia to secure the safety of Hanover.
Although England's foreign minister Newcastle felt that the
agreement with Pussia would prevent England from becoming
involved in a continental conflict, the Convention of St.
Petersberg upset the traditional continental system and set
off a profound realignment.
Frederick II of Prussia, faced with the possibility of a
concerted onslaught from England, Austria and Pussia, sought
to achieve the insulation of Germany from the growing
Anglo-French conflict. In January 1756 Prussia and England
concluded the Convention of Westminster in which both sides
pledged not to "...attack, or invade, directly or
indirectly, the territories of the other,..." and
additionally, both sides affirmed to "...prevent their
respective allies from undertaking against the said
teritories in any matter whatever."
The Anglo-Prussian alliance produced a severe diplomatic
backlash in both France and Russia. France was outraged
that Frederick had negotiated with his longtime enemy and
did not even bother to consult France beforehand. Russia
felt England had betrayed the Convention of St. Petersberg
20
which was directed against Prussia. The benefactor of this
backlash vas Austria.
On 1 May 1756 France and Austria signed the First Treaty
of Versailles. The treaty bound both parties to provide
24,000 men in the event that either one of the parties
should be attacked. Although the small number of men
and the defensive nature of the treaty make it relatively
insignificant militarily, its most dramatic impact was the
change that it represented in international relations. The
Francc-Austro alliance reversed the historic antagonisms
that had existed between Austria and France a. -" demonstrates
the subordination of ideological and dynastic differences to
the maintenance of the international system and the balance
of power
.
The Franco-Austro alliance, coupled with the
Anglo-Prussian alliance resulted in Russia seeking closer
ties with Austria and France. Russia sought to conclude an
alliance with Austria against Prussia, although it was not
until after the start of the Seven Years War that Russia
acceded to the First Treaty of Versailles at the end of
1756.
Although war between the imperial powers of France and
England began in May 1756, the expansion of the war to the
European continent was the result of the actions of
Frederick II. Frederick, faced with the possibility of
attack from Austria, Russia, Saxony, and France, decided
21
that fighting a preemptive war was Prussia's best chance for
survival. On 29 August 1756 Frederick launched the invasion
of Saxony. Thus, England's diplomatic attempts to pacify
the continent had instead precipitated a diplomatic
revolution which now resulted in the most desperate struggle
on the continent in the eighteenth century.
D. THE SEVEN YEARS WAR
The Seven Years Kar was an epic struggle with wide
fluctuations of fortune. Although Frederick gained an
? 5initial success ever Saxony at Piena on 16 October 1756,
once Austria, Russia and France mobilized opposition,
Prussia's existence was in jeopardy. Frederick suffered
defeats at Kolin by the Austrian army on 18 June 1757, and
only Austria's inability to pursue the routed Prussian army
saved Frederick from complete destruction. The Russians
defeated the Prussian army under Marshal Lehwaldt at
Gross-Jaegersdorf on 30 August 1757, threatening Frederick
with the loss of East Prussia. Additionally, the Swedes,
who had joined the anti-Prussian coalition in March invaded
Pomerania in September. A final devastating blow fell to
Prussia when the Duke of Cumberland and his Hanoverian army
signed the Convention of Kloster-Seven with the French on 8
September as Cumberland's army was trapped in between the
North Sea and the Elbe river.
Faced with the destruction of Prussia, Frederick then
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engineered two masterful victories that assured the future
existence of Prussia and solidified his reputation as a
military leader of exceptional abilities. At Rossbach in
November, Frederick defeated the Franco-Imperial army
despite being outnumbered by two to one. One month later
Frederick crushed the Austrians in a brilliant triumph at
Leuthen, thereby securing Prussia's hold on Silesia.
Although Frederick had now regained, and indeed
strengthened Prussia's prestige, the losses suffered by the
Prussian army during these campaigns seriously weakened the
long term prospects for Prussia's survival. Fortunately,
the coalition against Frederick suffered a series of
internal crises that dissolved the alliance before Prussia
collapsed
.
In March 1760 France signed the Third Treaty of
Versailles, cutting French subsidies to Austria and reducing
military support to 100,000 troops for use in Germany.
This reduction was most likely the result of the combination
of the low level of compensation offered by the Austrian's
for the French services and the need for France to
concentrate its efforts against England.
More importantly, on 5 January 1762 Elizabeth of Russia
died. Elizabeth had been the driving force in the
anti-Prussian coalition since 1759, and her replacement,
Peter III, who was an ardent admirer of Frederick ordered
an immediate armistice. In May Russia and Prussia signed a
2 3
peace agreement, leaving Austria alone to attempt to defeat
Prussia and recapture Silesia.
The collapse of the anti-Frussian alliance resulted in
successful peace negotiations between Prussia and Austria.
Additionally, the Anglo-French conflict was resolved in a
separate treaty. The dual nature of the peace treaties was
a direct reflection of the dual nature of the war - one
which pitted the imperial power of England against France,
and the other the struggle between Prussia and Austria over
Silesia and the domination over Germany.
The Seven Years Kar ended with few changes to the
territorial division of Europe, although it had important
long term effects on the conduct of the great powers.
Frederick's military capabilities had ensured Prussia's
existence as a great power, but only at a tremendous cost.
Prussia was now completely isolated in Europe - Austria and
Saxony were bitter enemies and the French only slightly less
so. Only an alliance with Russia was possible and this only
extended as far as their mutual interests.
France, despite remaining the strongest power in terms
of population and resources, had suffered a serious blow to
its military reputation. England had secured naval
supremacy over France, and Prussia's military prowess was
now more highly regarded than that of France. Additionally,
France's traditional hostility to Austria would eventually
reemerge as the result of the failure of the Franco-Austro
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alliance. France's defeat in the Seven Years War also
produced a series of domestic controversies which weakened
the French monarchy, thereby laying the groundwork for the
events that would rock the continent in 1789.
Although England emerged as the potential greatest
victor of the war. English diplomats failed to demand
adequate compensation from the French during the peace
negotiations, and in a large part they " ..undid the
overwhelming victory of Great Eritain by adroitly
alternating resolution with timely concession." The
concessions granted by England ensured that France would
eventually regain its greatness, and then undoubtedly seek
revenge
.
The defeat of France coupled with the traditional
English desire to avoid continental entanglements resulted
in the balance of power shifting to the east, where Prussia,
Russia and Austria dominated the affairs of the continent,
particularly in Poland and Turkey.
E. SUMMARY
After looking at the history of European relations in
the eighteenth century, on the surface it would appear that
a state of international anarchy existed. This perception
is superficial, however, when the diplomatic situation is
looked at from a broader perspective. Although the European
continent was involved in three major wars, with the
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exception of the Prussian conquest and annexation of
Silesia, the geographic division of Europe on the eve of the
French Revolution was very similar to that established by
the Treaty of Utrecht in April of 1713. Indeed, when
compared with previous epic struggles such as the wars of
religion and the national wars that later developed in the
nineteenth century, eighteenth century European relations
were relatively mild and stable. But what factors
contributed to the stability of the eighteenth century
international system and prevented the numerous conflicts
that developed in Europe from expanding into the large scale
conflicts of annihilation like the wars of the religion or
the clashes of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries?
Although there are numerous and complex forces involved,
there appears to be several key factors, either through
their presence or absence, that produced the stability of
the eighteenth century international system. The first
significant factor was the relative stability of the ruling
elites of the European dynastic states. This stability was
the result of the peace treaties of Utrecht, Rastatt and
Baden which re-established the legitimacy of the dynastic
rulers. Despite the fact that disagreements existed over
the rightful descendants to the throne in France, England
and Austria, the fundamental principles underlying the
dynastic order were never seriously challenged. Not only
did this situation allow for a commonality of outlook
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amongst the ruling elites, it also produced a highly
structured domestic order that helped to prevent videspread
domestic discontent. The combination of a common
fundamental belief in the correctness and legitimacy of the
dynastic principles, and the ordered structure of eighteenth
century society contributed significantly to the stability
of the international system.
The second factor was the absence of nationalism,
particularly as it affected the armed forces and the conduct
of international diplomacy. The lack of nationalism had a
profound influence on the military forces of the period.
The lack of a strong allegiance between subjects and kings
severely restricted the ability of monarchs to raise tax
revenues and personnel to support an army. As a result,
armies tended to be comprised of an officer corps of
nobility, who fought mainly for honor, glory or ambition,
and common soldiers, who fought for a living and could
therefore be considered almost as mercenaries.
Additionally, the lack of strong nationalist feelings
resulted in many armed forces being comprised of foreign
soldiers. The combination of the low quality state recruits
with little nationalist sentiments, and the use of foreign
troops who could never be completely trusted, severely
restricted the mobility of eighteenth century armed forces.
Finally, because these "professional" armies tended to be
expensive to maintain, the European monarchs tended to be
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conservative in their use and employment, another moderating
5 Rinfluence in eighteenth century relations. The
financial burden that large armies placed on the dynastic
state was reflected in the series of treaties between allies
during the eighteenth century, which often times called for
the granting of subsidies as often as it called for troop
assistance
.
The lack of nationalist sentiment amongst the personnel
of the armed forces also had significant implications for
their employment on the battlefield. As Professor Dorn
notes: "The greater numerical strength of armies, together
with the means of recruiting them, had introduced into the
ranks unreliable elements which could be kept with the
colors only by the most rigorous discipline and supervision.
To have permitted these armies to forage freely over the
countryside would have encouraged wholesale desertion."
As a result, battles tended to be systematic in nature, with
troops arranged in specified formations, and wars being
essentially fought through maneuver and position.
Additionally, since these armies were supplied through state
magazines, even if a battle had been won it was difficult to
pursue an army in retreat for fear of overextending supply
lines and thereby forcing increased desertions.
The absence of nationalism also affected the composition
of the diplomatic services of the period. Although
eighteenth century diplomatic services were not as
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internationalist as the armies of the period, many countries
used foreign diplomats to fill such posts as resident,
consul or secretary; and even higher positions if no
appropriate native personnel were available. Further
reinforcing the internationalist nature of diplomacy was the
adoption of both the French diplomatic system and the French
language as the standardized means of conducting
international relations. As M. S. Anderson observed:
"Nearly all great treaties of the century after that of
Utrecht were drawn up in French, though in each case with a
saving clause providing that this was not to be taken as a
precedent. Such was its prestige and attractive power that
by the second half of this period it was being used on a
considerable scale in many countries for correspondence
between diplomats and their governments." The
homogeneous nature of the diplomatic services of the
eighteenth century served to moderate conflicts and increase
international stability.
A third factor contributing to international stabilty
was the lack of widely divergent ideological views.
Although it is true that sometimes substantial differences
existed between the political, legal and commercial systems,
as well as between cultural and philosophical traditions
between the great powers, these differences were not so
divergent so as to prevent cooperation when critical issues
were at stake. The rapprochement between England and France
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following the War of the Spanish Succession and the
diplomatic revolution that preceded the Seven Years War
illustrates the flexibility that existed during this period.
The religious conflicts of the past vere no longer as
important, and Liberalism had yet to make a significant
impact on society.
The lack of ideological division reinforced the
internationalism of the period by contributing to the
feeling that Europe vas forming into a federation.
Additionally, the relative ideological homogeneity of the
period helped to ensure that the European powers did not
intervene in the domestic affcirs of the other powers,
reinforcing the stability of the ruling elites. Although
the great powers often sought territorial conquest and
aggrandizement, this was not perceived to be the extension
of a revolutionary domestic situation, but rather the result
of a common outlook amongst the powers, making warfare "...a
function if not an actual necessity, of the structure of
European society.
"
The absence of modern nationalism and the lack of widely
divergent ideological views contributed to a fourth factor,
which was the general internationalist perspective of the
ruling elites, and to a lesser extent, the peoples of
eighteenth century Europe. The subjects of the ruling
monarchs felt no particular allegiance to their king,
allowing an extensive degree of flexibility amongst the
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rulers. England accepted the Elector of Hanover as King,
Bourbons sat on the thrones of both France and Spain, and
dukes and grand dukes moved regularly between different
dynastic states. The ability of rulers to move between
states helped to contribute to the internationalist
perspective that pervaded European relations and served to
restrain the antagonisms that developed between states.
Additionally, because the powers did not feel that it
was necessary or proper to intervene in the domestic affairs
of another power, when faced with the threat of one power
attempting to establish continental hegemony, the remaining
powers would resort to a series of alliances to thwart the
aggressor. This outlook, which was commonly shared among
the ruling elites of Europe, helped to ensure the relatively
smooth functioning of the balance of power system without
extensive oversight and maintenance of the system.
A fifth factor that helped limit conflict was the fact
that the European powers were able to expand their empires
through colonization. This served as an important outlet,
particularly for France, England and Spain as these
countries were able to direct their expansionist desires
away from the center of the European continent. Although it
is true that colonial conflicts and cooperation played an
important role in the overall quality of the relationship
between the powers, colonial conflicts did not represent the
threat of engulfing the entire European continent in war.
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Conflicts that developed in the center of Europe, however,
had a tendency to escalate horizontally very rapidly as the
great powers became concerned over maintaining the balance
of power on the European continent. Although colonial
conflicts certainly added stress to continental problems,
the major conflicts of the eighteenth century began when
conflicts erupted in the center of the continent. Because
the colonial powers were more concerned with expanding their
empires, these countries supported diplomatic initiatives
designed to maintain the balance so as to avoid continental
entanglements, although the inability to restrain Frederick
of Prussia produced a continent consumed by war. Despite
the fact that the War of the Austrian Succession and the
Seven Years War were devastating conflicts for Europe, they
were relatively mild when compared with past and future
conflicts, and a portion of this mild nature can be
attributed to the fact that the European system was
expanding and pushing conflicts away from the center of
Europe
.
Finally, the end product of all these factors resulted
in the pursuit of limited military and diplomatic
initiatives with limited means to accomplish them. The
absence of nationalism and the relative ideological
homogeneity of the period placed constraints on both the
resources available to the dynastic rulers as well as
limiting the rational under which these limited resources
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could be usee. Additionally, the general internationalist
perspective and stability of the elites resulted in fev of
the rulers seeking to fight preemptive vars to preserve
their rule, with Frederick of Prussia being the notable
exception. Similarly, the desire for colonial expansion
resulted in several of the great powers seeking to preserve
the status quo on the European continent. The combination
of these factors resulted in a system that could be
characterized as one of limited means and limited ends.
The moderate and limited conduct of international
diplomacy in the eighteenth century vas radically altered by
the events in France in 1789. The French Revolution
resulted in the establishment of a French nation-state
rather than the traditional dynastic-state. Additionally,
the political and social reforms introduced in France, and
the response of the remaining powers to those reforms,
produced a fundamentally different ideological perspective
amongst the ruling elites of France. However, to assert
that the cause of international instability following the
French Revolution was the sole responsibility of the forces
of nationalism and ideology is incorrect. To determine what
factors created instability in the international system
following the French Revolution, this period must now be
more closely examined.
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III. THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
The French Revolution had a profound impact on the
international system. The balance of power system that had
evolved during the eighteenth century vas destroyed, and the
moderate internationalist perspective of the ancien regime
vas replaced by an increasingly nationalist outlook.
However, to assert that the emergence of both nationalism
and a French nation that had widely divergent ideological
views from the rest of Europe resulted in the destruction of
the international system is incomplete at best. Although
these factors played an important role, it was only after a
combination of other factors had emerged that these forces
were able to destroy the international system.
A. THE INITIAL REACTIONS TO THE FRENCH REVOLUTION
The early stages of the French Revolution posed little
threat to the international system. The balance of power
system of the eighteenth century continued to function, and
the antagonisms that existed were still the result of deep
seated traditional rivalries and jealousies rather than
ideological frictions. In England political reformers and
those excluded from political life by the Test Act welcomed
the principles of the Revolution, but to most Europeans the
Revolution appeared as an interesting spectacle. Although
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English public opinion gradually formed into tvo groups,
with both an ant i -revolutionary group and one that supported
it, throughout the period of the monarchical experiment in
France, the government of England led by William Pitt
maintained a strict neutrality.
In Germany the Revolution received sympathetic
curiosity, mainly from journalists and intellectuals. At
Mainz, Gottingen, Brunswick and Hamburg, intellectual
leaders such as Johannes von Muller, Forster , Schlozer,
Stolberg , Kaurillon and Klopstoc 1: supported the Revolution.
Similarly, at Weimar, Herder, vice-president of the
Consistory; Wieland, editor of Merkur ; and Johann Paul
Richter voiced their approval, although Goethe and Schiller
were reluctant but did not declare themselves opposed.
Despite the support for the Revolution demonstrated by
the political reformers in England and various intellectuals
in Germany, on the whole these countries were generally
indifferent to the events in France. The support of the
revolutionary principles in the Eastern European powers of
Prussia, Austria, and European Russia, however, was
considerably less. The Prussian peasant and middle classes
lagged substantially behind their French counterparts in
terms of development, and therefore they were both less
inclined and less capable to fight for equality. Although
the news of the fall of the Bastille was greeted with
rejoicing and met with approval by Archenholz, an editor of
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Ninerva ; by Nicolai, editor of the Deutsche Bibliotech ; and
•3
Reichardt, director of the Berlin Opera," the minister of
justice Wollner's censorship had little difficulty in
suppressing any pro-French propaganda.
In Austria, the policies of reform that vere implemented
by Maria Theresa following the Seven Years Kar, and
continued by Joseph II during the early portion of his
reign, vere mostly repealed. These policies, which were
designed to promote greater state infrastructure development
in order to support larger and stronger armed forces,
produced a great political awakening among the
non-privileged classes and jeopardized the stability of the
aristocratic class. Joseph IT, and later Leopold II may
have been able to manage the domestic problems created by
this "enlightened despotism", but these problems were
intensified by the failure of Austrian foreign policy.
Joseph's foreign policy was centered around an alliance
with Catherine II of Russia which was concluded in 1781.
Joseph hoped that by detaching Russia from Prussia that he
could obtain greater influence and prestige in Germany.
Similarly, with Austrian support Catherine felt she could
obtain territorial advantages in Turkey, particularly in the
long coveted Crimean peninsula. These ambitions were put
into affect in 1783 when Catherine acquired the Crimea from
Turkey, aided by Austrian diplomatic pressure. However,
when Joseph attempted to obtain Bavaria, Catherine's support
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for Austrian ambitions vas minimal, and Joseph suffered an
embarassing diplomatic defeat."
Austria's alliance vith Russia vas even more damaging to
Joseph when Catherine manipulated Austria into joining
Russia in declaring var on Turkey in February 1788. The
enormous financial requirements to support the army, coupled
vith the dislocation of trade and an unprecedented rise in
prices, quickly ruined the reforms instituted by Joseph, and
led the Hungarian nobility to revert to open opposition.
This crises vas further complicated by the mobilization of
Prussian, Polish and Saxon troops along the Austrian
frontier. As a result of these foreign policy and domestic
setbacks, Joseph II vas compelled to make far reaching
concessions to the aristocratic classes. The strength of
this developing reactionary movement vhich developed prior
to the French Revolution ensured that the revolutionary
principles vould have little effect in Austria.
Farther east, the combination of distance and poor
communications served to substantially dampen the influence
of the revolution in Russia. Only a handful of Russians,
most notably Novikov, the poet Radischev, and Prince
Gallitzin expressed liberal sympathies, but rather than
forming into revolutionary groups and organizations, they
expected liberal reforms to be instituted by the central
government. Faced vith the more pressing problems of the
var vith Turkey, Catherine and the nobility vere unvilling
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to implement reforms, and the weakness of the opposition
ensured the continued dominance of the aristocratic class
although some members of the bourgeois were allowed to
discuss commercial and municipal affairs and peasants were
7placed theoretically under the protection of the law.
Thus throughout Europe, the reaction to the French
Revolution was one of indifference. Only Sweden's king
Gustavus III advocated a crusade to restore the French
monarchy, but the influence of Sweden in European affairs
had diminished greatly, and the great powers were unwilling
to pay the expense that would be associated to undertake a
war against France. In fact, to the leaders of the great
powers the French Revolution merely meant that France would
be incapacitated in foreign affairs, and therefore the
remaining powers would be able to benefit further at
France's expense. Already the period of French decline
that began after the Seven Years War had resulted in
Austria, Prussia and Russia gaining territory through the
First Partition of Poland in 1772, and the Russian
annexation of the Crimea in 1783. Since France had long
supported Poland and Turkey, the aggrandizement of Austria,
Prussia and Russia without some form of compensation for
France demonstrated the decline of French influence in
Europe prior to the Revolution, and with further domestic
turmoil it was believed that greater gains could be obtained
at France's expense.
40
B. THE UNDERMINING OF INTERNATIONAL STABILITY
The assumption by the great povers that they would
benefit at France's expense was based on the belief that the
international system would continue to operate in its
traditional eighteenth century manner. However, the
previously mentioned gains made by Prussia, Russia and
Austria without compensation to France already indicated
that the traditional workings of the system were in
jeopardy. The "rules of the game" were altered even more
radically when in early August of 1789 the representative of
the nobles, Viconte de Noailles, voluntarily surrendered all
feudal rights and privileges, resulting in the National
Assembly of France announcing an end to the feudal regime.
This proclamation was followed by the Declaration of the
Rights of Kan on August 27. These two acts had significant
implications for future events, although at the time the
real significance of these events was less clear to those
who observed them.
The weakening of the royal authority in France led to
the flight of sizeable numbers of the French nobility.
These French emigres spread anti-revolutionary propaganda
throughout Europe, but they were particularly influential in
Austria and Prussia for two primary reasons. First, in the
province of Alsace, over which the French Bourbons had
claimed sovereignty, the German princes became alarmed by
France's public disavowal of all feudal rights and
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obligations, and realized that the revolutionary principles
represented a direct threat to their rule over their
dominions. Austria and Prussia, as the primary competitors
for influence and prestige in Germany -were therefore eager
to defend the feudal rights of the German princes in order
to expand their influence in the German principalities.
The disorders of 1789 also caused a severe economic
crises for the French national treasury. To alleviate the
crises the National Assembly sought to confiscate certain
property. Since the confiscation of private property was
contrary to the principles of the revolution and the rights
of man, an alternative would have to be found. The
alternative was to seize the properties of the church, since
it represented a corporation rather than a private
person. This action was met with great protest by Pope
Pius VI, who could count on support from the Austrian
emperor Leopold.
The ant i -revolutionary support that these two factors
produced was perhaps insufficient to lead Prussia and
Austria to oppose France, but the dramatic and celebrated
flight of Louis XVI in June 1791 forced their hands.
Although many of the reforms enacted by the National
Assembly contributed to the decision of Louis to attempt to
flee Paris, the event that precipitated this action was the
condemnation of the civil constitution and the political and




The condemnation by the Fope was the result of a long
struggle over church reform following the Revolution. The
National Assembly's reforms resulted in reducing the
prestige and authority of the bishops by depriving them of
all but their purely spiritual or ecclesiastical functions.
Additionally, the reforms reduced the number of dioceses in
France from 135 to 8?. 12
The reforms endorsed by the National Assembly were not
submitted for approval to the French church, and as a result
the church was presented a virtual ultimatum and left the
bishops with the difficult task of negotiating its
acceptance with the papacy. The National Assembly believed
that the papacy would eventually consent because the
Assembly could threaten to annex the papal enclaves of
Avignon and Venaissin that resided on French territory.
Relations between the papacy and the Assembly were strained
further when on 20 November 1790 the Assembly required the
French clergy to take an oath that required them to uphold
the constitution decreed by the Assembly. Although the
majority of the French bishops refused to take the oath, the
majority of the lower clergy submitted. In support of the
French bishops, Pius condemned the Assembly's act. This
condemnation resulted in numerous retractions by the clergy
who had taken the oath and caused the majority of French
bishops to emigrate. These events persuaded Louis XVI of





The flight of the King and his family on 20 June 1791
was one of the most important events of the Revolution. The
king's attempted escape was halted at Varennes, and he vas
returned to Paris under heavy guard. The news of the flight
produced a storm of invective protests against the royal
family, and raised fears that an invasion of France was
1 Aimminent
.
The arrest of Louis XVI and the suspension of his powers
resulted in the Austrian Emperor Leopold II, who was the
brother of the French queen, to take an active diplomatic
stance to safeguard the interests of the French monarchy.
On 6 July 1791 Leopold forwarded the Padau Circular to the
empress of Russia and the kings of England, Prussia, Spain,
Naples and Sardinia. The circular urged the need for
concerted action "...to vindicate the liberty and honour of
the most Christian King and his family to limit the
1 cdangerous extremes of the French revolution." Although
initially some hesitation existed in Russia, and England
refused to commit itself, the anti-French coalition gained
strength on 25 July when Prussia and Austria, historical
rivals, concluded a preliminary defensive alliance designed
to produce a European concert for the settlement of French
affairs. 16
It is difficult to assess the effectiveness of these
declarations on the French National Assembly. The Assembly
exercised prudent moderation in not dethroning Louis,
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however, this moderation can be just as easily be attributed
to the moderates that broke away from the Jacobins and
formed the Feuillant club. However, to Leopold it appeared
that the situation in Faris had been stabilized by his
initiative, and therefore the decision was made to continue
to exert diplomatic pressure on the revolutionaries in
France. On 27 August 1791 Frederich William II of Prussia
and Leopold issued the Declaration of Pillnitz. The
declaration called for the joint effort of all European
sovereigns to help Louis restore a monarchical system in
France. Since England had previously refused to commit
itself to the Fadau Circular, however, it was unlikely that
a joint effort could be agreed upon. Since Austria and
Prussia had no intention of acting without the support of
all the European monarchies, this declaration was
essentially ineffective from the outset.
Despite this ineffectiveness, its effect on the French
revolutionaries was dramatic. The declaration fueled French
fears of counter-revolutionary actions from Austria and
Prussia; and the actions of the French emigres, German
princes and the Pope contributed to this feeling. The fears
of counter-revolution also served to undermine the National
Assembly, for although it had been able to secure the
acceptance of a revised constitution by Louis on 14
September 1791, it was largely perceived as having pandered
to the special interests of the middle class and Feuillants.
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Additionally, the popular outcry against the monarch as a
result of his flight made the establishment of a
constitutional monarchy unlikely. As a result, the assembly
dissolved itself on 30 September and a new body, the
Legislative Assembly was convened on 1 October.
The Legislative Assembly almost immediately turned its
attention to the threats of counter-revolution. The right
wing parties comprised of the constitutionalists, royalists
and Feuillants lost strength almost daily as the left wing
parties of the Plain, Girondists and the Mountain increased.
This shift, in strength is partially attributed to the
continued flight of the aristocratic class and the revenues
they took with them. The flight of capital from France
resulted in a depreciation of the French assignats, and led
many of the reolut ionar ies to blame the deteriorating
1 7economic conditions on the royalist supporters. This
problem led to the decree of 9 November 1791 that imposed on
all emigres who had joined the armed concentration outside
French frontiers to repatriate themselves by 1 January 1792
or face the penalties of treason and the confiscation of
their property.
Additionally, the Girondists were concerned with the
armed companies of emigres assembled on the territory of the
elector of Treves, and as a result on 29 November the
Assembly requested Louis to summon the elector to dissolve
them. Since the elector was a prince of the Holy Roman
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Empire, however, he would undoubtedly seek advice and aid
from the Imperial Diet and the emperor. On December \A,
Louis announced that he was sending the summons, and the
minister of war Narbonne followed this with a request to
call up three armies. The mobilization of troops was
supported by both the right and the left in the Assembly.
The royalists viewed any potential conflict as a means to
restore the strength of the monarchy through control of the
army, while the left supported the potential conflict as a
war of defense against the unjust aggressions of the
monarchies of Europe.
When the elector of Treves received the summons, he
turned to the emperor Leopold for help. Though he was not
particularly sympathetic towards the emigres, he informed
the elector that he would provide protection only if the
emigres were dispersed by the end of December. The emigres
were thus disbanded, and the threat of immediate
intervention was removed. However, on the basis of these
new threats Leopold resumed his policy of intimidation,
renewing the threats made at Pillnitz and concluding an
alliance between Austria and Prussia on 7 February 1792.
Despite the death of Leopold on 1 March and the accession of
Francis II, the process of intimidation continued. Faced
with increasing pressures, France seized the initiative and
prepared to march into Belgium in late March, and on 20




The War of the First Coalition against France however
did not mark the destruction of the international system
that had developed during the eighteenth century, nor was
the war the total ideological clash that it would later
develop into. In this early stage of the conflict, however,
several key factors were already emerging that would
eventually contribute to the destruction of the classical
balance of power system.
The first factor was the instability of elites that
developed in both the German principalities in Alsace and
within France. The German princes, concerned over the
abolishment of aristocratic privileges within their domains
became exceedingly apprehensive about the solidity of their
rule. This apprehensiveness led to appeals to both the Pope
and the Holy Roman Emperor for protection to stabilize their
positions .
In France, the instability that developed within the
elite ruling classes was particularly dangerous due to the
bipolarization of French society. Supporters of the
monarchy were under constant threat from the liberal
excesses of the revolution, and the flight of many emigres
reinforced this instability as the aristocratic class
rapidly decreased in size. The revolutionaries were also
extremely unstable as the threat of counter-revolution was
well known as both the emigres and the king had engaged in
foreign intrigues to restore the strength of the monarchy.
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The revolutionaries vere also destabilized by the breakdown
of the French economy following the revolution. Inflation
had already developed by the time of the War of the First
Coalition, and thus the National and later the Legislative
Assembly was faced with both internal and external threats.
The flight of the king to Varennes reinforced the perception
of the external counter-revolutionary threat as the majority
of the French felt that the king was attempting to leave the
country to organize a counter-revolutionary crusade.
Although it is possible that the external threats to the
elites could have been solved diplomatically, this course of
action was highly unlikely because of the effects that a
second factor was having on the international system.
The second factor that emerged was the breakdown in the
cohesiveness of the international system, although it would
not be until later in the conflict that the international
system would be completely destroyed. Still, the Revolution
had a critical impact on the political structures of France,
and the elites who now controlled foreign policy making
decisions viewed interstate relations in a fundamentally
different way from the elites of the ancien regime. This
fundamental difference was perhaps best exemplified by the
National Assembly on 22 May 1790 when it renounced "...in
the name of the French nation all wars of conquest, and
promised never to employ French forces against the liberty
of a people." The differences in outlook of the French
49
and the ancien regime would become exacerbated as the
monarchs of Europe would continue to conduct international
affairs along classic eighteenth century lines. The failure
of the European powers to accommodate revolutionary France
and incorporate France into the existing international
system, as shall be seen later, had an extremely
destabilizing impact on the international system as the
feedback that occurred between the two perspectives led to
the polarization of the international system and eventually
resulted in an ideological war between the antagonists.
Finally, the conflict that erupted in 1792 was in the
center of Europe and the international system. Throughout
the eighteenth century conflicts that developed in the heart
of the European continent tended to escalate horizontally as
the great powers became quickly involved to maintain the
balance of power. Although it is true that colonial
conflicts often reverberated back to Europe and increased
tensions on the continent, the great conflicts of the
eighteenth century were all precipitated by a clash on the
continent
.
C. THE DESTRUCTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM INTENSIFIES
Although at the outbreak of the War of the First
Coalition the classical balance of power system was not
destroyed, the previously mentioned factors served to weaken
the system considerably. Although it might have been
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possible to restore the system through a concerted effort by
the coalition monarchies, the events that took place during
the war would eventually destroy the system.
The survival of revolutionary France during the critical
years 1792 to ] 794 was not the result of French strength but
rather the result of the ineptitude of the coalition formed
against it. The coalition monarchies did not yet realize
the threat that France posed to the international system,
and therefore they continued to conduct themselves along
classic eighteenth century lines. This contributed
significantly to the destruction of the international system
for two primary reasons. First, concerns over territorial
compensations, particularly the partition of Poland,
prevented the coalition from concentrating its efforts to
end the French problems. Second, by continuing to operate
along classical lines, the coalition provided feedback that
further radicalized the French Pevolutionary process as the
"evils" preached by the revolutionaries about the European
monarchical system came to be perceived as true. This
development led to a revolutionizing of the war and
eventually allowed it to take on its ideological form.
The war started with the French intending to overrun the
Austrian Netherlands with 50,000 men in a decisive and rapid
thrust. The Girondist ministry led by Dumouriez believed
that French revolutionary propaganda would result in the
French being received as liberators beyond their borders,
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and therefore concerns over the readiness of the army was
less important than taking bold action. The French generals
Luckner, Fochambeau, and Lafayette, as veil as the officer
corps, however, were fairly veil trained for var and did not
fully support the adventurous proposals of Dumouriez.
Additionally, the officers distrusted the undisciplined
troops, and the enlisted personnel suspected the officers of
treason as large numbers of officers continued to emigrate.
The lack of confidence and distrust that existed
throughout the French armies had serious repercussions at
the beginning of the conflict. Cn 29 April 1792 the French,
under the command of Dillon and Firon vere ordered into a
retreat upon the first sighting of Austrian troops.
Similarly, Carle and Lafayette vithdrev before even sighting
the enemy. These actions led the enlisted personnel to cry
treason and disband. By June the French offensive had
failed, with the generals blaming the poor discipline and
inadequate training as the reasons, although the generals
had shovn no vill to fight.
Despite the troubles experienced by the French army, the
allies vere unable to take advantage of the situation. Like
the French revolutionaries, the French emigres convinced the
allies that they vould be greeted in France as liberators.
Bolstered by these proclamations, Prussian and Austrian
forces invaded France in the summer of 1792. By September,
the allies had reached Valmy, one hundred miles east of
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Paris. The invasion of France, coupled with the
deteriorating economic conditions provided fertile grounds
for further revolutionary Girondist propaganda as many
French citizens were convinced that a clandestine committee
was passing millions in gold to Austria, paying emigres,
causing the financial crises by deliberately buying up the
French market, and divulging French military plans to the
23enemy
.
The combination of the poor performance of the French
army and Girondist propaganda served to further polarize
French society. The Girondist ministry issued three
revolutionary decrees in late May and early June to remove
nonjuring priests, disband the King's personal bodyguards,
and raise a new levee of 20,000 men to set up military camps
in Faris to remove the enemies of the republic. Louis XVI
realized that these decrees would make him a captive of the
Girondins, and because Louis felt that the conflict that had
erupted would restore the strength of the monarchy, he
vetoed two of the bills, most importantly the establishment
of the military camps. Roland, head of the interior
ministry, urged the King to accept the decrees to prevent
violent consequences, but Dumouriez, who believed that he
could enhance his personal power and prestige convinced
Louis to dismiss Roland, and elevate himself to war
minister. Dumouriez's appointment was not well received by
the Assembly and within a week Dumouriez was forced to
resign his ministerial post.
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The fall of the Girondist Ministry and its replacement
by the new Feuillant ministry resulted in the Parisian
sans-culottes of the democratic faubourgs invading the
Tuileries palace on 20 June to force the King to restore the
Girondist ministers. The demonstration failed to intimidate
Louis, and attempts by General Lafayette to disband the
Jacobin and other radical clubs failed as the Assembly
refused to support strong measures to halt further
revolutionary activities.
As the external threat became greater, the actions of
the Girondins and the Assembly resulted in the intervention
of extra-parliamentary forces. The Girondin leaders
"invited" units of the national guards, including the
provisional federes, to attend the Festival of Federation on
14 July. On 5 July the Assembly declared that in the
event of danger to the nation, all able bodied men would be
called to service and arms requisitioned. On 9 July Brissot
accused the king and his ministers of treason, and implied
that the king might be deposed. Faced with this increasing
revolutionary activity, the Feuillant ministry resigned on
10 July, opening up the possibility of a return of the
Girondins. The Girondins, anxious to restore their lost
power made the fateful decision to seek the support of the
King instead of siding with the increasingly revolutionary
populace. As a result, they now became defenders of the
throne. On 11 July the Assembly declared "the Fatherland in
54
danger", further heightening political tensions and tilting
the political balance increasingly to the side of the
revolutionaries
.
The increasing revolutionary situation in Paris, coupled
with the pleas from Marie Antoinette for the issue of an
ultimatum to restrain the fury of the Parisians until troops
arrived resulted in the Brunswick Manifesto of 11 July. The
manifesto required "...the city of Paris and all its
inhabitants, without distinction ... to submit at once and
without delay to the King." Additionally, "If any force or
insult is used against the Palace of the Tuileries, if the
least violence or the least outrage is done Their Majesties
..." the allied powers would "...exact an exemplary and
forever memorable vengeance by delivering the city of Paris
to military execution and total subversion, and the rebels
who are guilty of such outrages to the punishments they will
27have deserved."
The publication of the manifesto in Paris on 1 August
had the opposite affect that its drafters intended. The
federes and the Jacobin club had already listened to
Robespierre's radical program calling for the overthrow of
the monarchy and the displacement of the Legislative
Assembly, and on 3 August forty-seven of the forty-eight
Parisian sections petitioned the Assembly for the deposition
of Louis XVI. The manifesto had thus heightened the fears
of counter-revolution throughout these radical groups, and
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as a result the Palace of the Tuileries was stormed on 10
August and the King was suspended from his duties.
The delegates from the sections who had met to plan the
insurrection established the revolutionary Commune of Paris.
The Commune imprisoned the King and his family in the
Temple, and then called for a National Convention to be
elected by universal suffrage. The Legislative Assembly
remained in existence until the 20 September although its
strength and influence diminished almost daily.
As domestic conditions deteriorated in France during the
period of the "second revolution", the military threat
increased. On 19 August Prussian armies under Brunswick
crossed the French frontier, and shortly thereafter broke
? Rthrough the fortresses at Longwy and Verdun. Lafayette,
who had tried to turn back his army to rescue the monarchy
fled to Austria on 20 August where he would later be
imprisoned
.
When news of the military misfortunes reached Paris,
what little authority remained collapsed. Rumors began to
circulate that the criminals in the Paris prisons were
covertly aiding the enemy and the emigres. This resulted in
the September Massacres as between 1090 and 1395
criminal and political prisoners were killed between 2 and 7
September, a foretaste of the terror that was yet to come as
the revolutionaries sought to eliminate the threat of
counter-revolution from within.
56
The Prussian advance continued as conditions
deteriorated in France. Brunswick had maneuvered his troops
between the French army commanded by Dumouriez and Paris,
leaving Paris open to invasion. Dumouriez sent for
reinforcements from Kellermann's army, and on the morning of
20 September Brunswick's and Kellermann's troops came into
contact with one another near the hills around the village
of Valmy. Dumouriez' army came up in support, and in the
morning fog a large artillery exchange took place. The
famous battle was really not much of an encounter, and
although it was the largest artillery exchange to date, only
180 Prussian and 300 French soldiers were killed. As
the weather conditions deteriorated with the onset of fall
and winter, and sickness set in amongst the troops, the
cabinets at Vienna and Berlin decided to withdraw their
troops until France was further weakened from internal
conflict. Additionally, both Prussia and Austria were much
more concerned with the events taking place in Poland.
The events in Poland were critical to the survival of
the French Revolution. Russia, which had already gained
from the First Partition of Poland in 1772 had launched
another assault on the truncated Polish state. Austria and
Prussia, as well as England, Sweden and Turkey viewed the
attempted Russian expansion as a threat to the European
system as one of the powers was attempting to expand and
increase its influence. At the time this was considered the
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greater threat to Europe as Russia was seen as seeking to
alter the balance of power in its favor. Although Prussia
and Austria desired to restore the French monarchy, this
restoration could wait for a more precipitous moment. The
events in Poland prevented the two powers from concentrating
their military efforts against France during the time when
the French army was perhaps its most vulnerable. Although
in hindsight this is now more clearly seen, it illustrates
an important point about how the international system would
become increasingly unstable.
D. THE BREAKDOWN OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
The international system of the eighteenth century was
slow to react and adapt to a revolutionary actor. The
leaders of the ancien regime continued to operate along
classic balance of power lines and did not perceive the
threat that France posed to the underlying values that the
system was built upon. It was this threat, and not the one
of Russian expansion that threatened to radically alter the
eighteenth century European system.
Intoxicated by the withdrawal of allied forces from
Valmy and the revolutionary advances made in August, on 21
September 1792 the National Convention abolished the
monarchy and established a republic. These events and the
September Massacres resulted in revolutionary France at
least temporarily removing the threat of counterrevolution,
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and with greater self confidence France began to assert
itself against the monarchies of a hostile Europe. Within
three months French armies occupied Mainz, Speyer and
a i
Brussels, and France annexed Savoy and Nice. 2 The French
occupation of these areas resulted in local patriots
requesting French protection from counter-revolutionary
reprisals. These requests produced the Edict of Fraternity
issued on 19 November 1792 which stated: "The National
Convention declares in the name of the French nation that it
will accord fraternity and assistance to all peoples who
wish to recover their liberty. It charges the executive
power to give the generals the necessary orders for bearing
help to these peoples and defending citizens who are vexed
for the cause of liberty."
Although the French foreign minister Lebrun attempted to
explain that the edict only applied to those countries
engaged in war with France, French sympathizers throughout
Europe hailed the French proclamation as a symbol of French
desires to liberate the remainder of Europe. The
conservative monarchs of Europe interpreted the decree as a
direct challenge to their rule. Thus the conflict that was
initially perceived by France as a defensive effort against
the allies had now turned into an ideological struggle as
the French Revolutionary principles became opposed to those
of the European monarchies. Additionally, despite Lebrun •
s
efforts, the true French intentions were revealed by Brissot
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on 26 November when he argued that the Republic of France,
engaged in a death struggle vith the "German colossus" could
not be "...at ease until Europe, and all of Europe, is in
flames." Additionally, Brissot demanded the Rhine as a
frontier and proclaimed "...our liberty will never rest
quietly as long as a Bourbon is enthroned. There can be no
peace with a Bourbon; with that understood we must consider
an expedition into Spain."
The ideological nature of the war was further polarized
in December when Dumouriez was unable to obtain local loans
in Belgium to meet his military expenditures. As a result,
on 15 December the Convention declared that war expenditures
incurred during the liberation of subject people abroad
would be defrayed by introducing the French assignats into
liberated areas. The c.ssignats would be secured by the
sequestered property of the clerical and noble estates.
As Lefebrve points out, this "...war for chateaux; peace for
cottages..." decree instituted the "...dictatorship of
revolutionary minorities under the protection of French
bayonets, and undertook to secure the fortunes of other
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peoples without consulting them, at their expense." The
final ideological break between France and the rest of
Europe occurred on 21 January 1793 when Louis XVI was
guillotined
.
The execution of Louis XVI further strained the
relations between many of the neutral monarchs of Europe and
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the French republic. In England William Pitt had succeeded
in maintaining England's neutrality, although French
revolutionary propaganda continued to irritate England's
ruling elite. A series of royal edicts combined with
government subsidized conservative propaganda, however,
successfully countered this threat. As Dumouriez of France
began to press for military entry into Holland, however,
thereby threatening to take over Europe's largest banking
center as well as an ally of England, foreign relations
between the two countries deteriorated rapidly. The
execution of the king served as a pretext to war. On 24
January the Marquis de Chauvelin was given his passport from
England, a clear signal that England was prepared to break
diplomatic relations with France. Rather than wait for
Chauvelin 's expulsion, the French recalled him the next day.
On 1 February 1793 the National Convention voted for a
declaration of war against England.
The execution of the king also had a dramatic affect on
French foreign relations with Spain and the Holy Roman
Empire. Louis' trial provoked demonstrations in Spain
against France, and it soon became apparent that Madrid's
neutrality depended upon the verdict. After 21 January,
French proposals for neutrality were summarily refused. On
7 March France declared war against Spain. With Spain now
involved in the war, English access to the Mediterranean was
virtually assured, and the increased English naval presence
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allowed the states of Italy greater freedom of action in
joining the allies.
The ideological character of the war was brought about
by the complex interplay of the revolutionary forces in
France and the reaction of the international system. The
failure of the monarchical experiment was in no way
inevitable at the outset. However, the structure of
government in France was substantially weakened following
the events of 1789, and attempts by the monarchs of Europe
to strengthen the French government through external actions
to support Louis XVI only exacerbated the problem. The
rhetoric of the allies heightened fears of a
counter-revolution, reinforcing the radicalism of the more
revolutionary Jacobin and Mountain parties. Additionally,
during this "age of democratic revolution", ?.t was only
natural that some democratization in foreign policy would
occur, and as these parties grew in strength, French foreign
policy became increasingly susceptible to their influence,
which then triggered even harsher outbursts from the allies
as evidenced by the Padau Circular and the Pillnitz and
Brunswick Declarations. The outbreak of war completed the
radicalization of French society as the weakened political
structures could not cope with the shocks produced by the
military defeats that were suffered in the summer of 1792.
Although ideology had now become an important element in
the international system, the capacity of the balance of
62
power system to contain France had not yet been exceeded.
It was still possible for the allies either to tacitly
accept the revolution by abandoning the provocative rhetoric
against France, thereby increasing French security and
hopefully diminishing the ideological character that the war
had assumed, or to launch a large scale
counter-revolutionary effort to restore the monarchical
system. Instead, the allies fell between two stools and
chose to continue their rhetorical assault while pursuing
the traditional eighteenth century diplomacy that stressed
limited territorial aims achieved with limited means. The
allied policies, when coupled with the instabilities that
existed in France resulted in an unprecedented feeling of
patriotism throughout France. This rising patriotism would
later contribute significantly to the collapse of the
international system as rising nationalism substantially
altered key factors in the balance of power system.
England's entry into the anti-French coalition resulted
in a significant horizontal escalation of the conflict as
the combination of English diplomacy, subsidies, and naval
pressure extended the number of allies. The allied forces
were therefore able to successfully expel the French from
the Rhineland and the Austrian Netherlands. Dumouriez,
whose army was defeated and thereby lost most of the
Netherlands, defected to the Austrians. These events,
coupled with the Royalist support of the peasant revolt over
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the issue of conscription that occurred in the Vendee in
March increased revolutionary activity in France and forced
the Convention to create institutions to eliminate internal
opposition and strengthen the Republican armies. In April,
the Convention established the Committee of General Security
and the Committee of Public Safety. These two committees/
but mainly the Committee of Public Safety, soon exercised
dictatorial powers through the leadership of Danton and
Robespierre. The arrest of 31 Girondist deputies on 2 June
ensured radical domination of the committees.
The Committee of Public Safety began to establish the
mechanisms that would eventually lead to the Reign of
Terror. However, despite the increasing control over the
internal opposition, France continued to suffer military
setbacks in the summer of 1793. However, just as during the
previous allied assault on France, once again the European
powers continued to operate along classic eighteenth century
lines, and rather than marching on Paris, England broke off
towards Dunkirk and the Austrian's towards Maubeuge as both
countries attempted to obtain territory which could be used
as pawns for the coming peace conference. Similarly,
Prussia and Russia, which had become engaged in another
series of intrigues over the Second Partition of Poland in
January of 1793, were once again more concerned with the
events in Poland and the exclusion of Austria from the
Polish agreement a policy that would create divisions within
the alliance.
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Although the allies of the First Coalition all had
different war aims, the allies also suffered from an
inability to exploit their resources. The people of France
were much more willing to make sacrifices because they
perceived that the revolutionary regime was responsible for
the liberal freedoms that they had obtained. By contrast,
the allies were much less willing to ask for sacrifices out
of fear that concessions would be demanded in return. The
failure of the allies to decisively defeat France provided
the revolutionary government the time to adopt extreme
measures to combat the external threats to the Republic. On
23 August 1793 French patriotism reached new heights when a
levy was placed in principle on every Frenchman and
Frenchwoman: "Young men will go to the front; married men
will forge arms and transport foodstuffs; women will tear
rags into lint; old men will get themselves carried to
public places, there to stir up the courage of the warriors,
"37hatred of kings and unity in the republic.""
The lack of unity among the allies was exploited by the
French revolutionary generals who assumed the offensive and
cleared France of invaders. It is important to note that
this was accomplished prior to the mobilization of French
society, as the allied defeat was accomplished with only the
levy of 300,000 men that had been requisitioned at the
beginning of the war. This had an important influence on
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French nationalism as it was transformed from Fisorgimento
nationalism, which is defined as the liberation from
political and social oppression, to integral nationalism,
which espoused slogans about national supremacy and
superiority of the French nation and resulted in French
territorial expansion. The fact that French
mobilization did not become effective until after France had
assumed the offensive was important psychologically for
French citizens. The hardships endured by the French
citizens through the dislocation of large numbers of the
population, coupled with its accompanying affect on societal
production that resulted in the establishment of the maximum
price policy on large numbers of consumer goods, may have
resulted in the collapse of the revolutionary government had
they been in effect during the period of French setbacks in
early 1793. Since these hardships came into effect during a
time when the French had gained the offensive, however, it
decreased the impact of these hardships on French society,
at least psychologically as the French citizens were able to
console themselves with the fact that their sacrifices
resulted in French victories. The French victories thus had
an intoxicating affect on French society as it became
consumed by the exuberance of victory.
The development of nationalism in France was another
important factor in the destruction of the eighteenth
century international system, primarily through its affects
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on the limited form of warfare of the eighteenth century and
on international diplomacy. The adoption of a policy of
near universal conscription, which could only be tolerated
by a nationalistic society, produced a great increase in the
number of soldiers available to the French generals.
Besides allowing the French generals to fight more
aggressive and costly campaigns and more of them, French
foreign policy now carried more weight. Additionally, by
supplying armies through requisitions from occupied
territories, the French were able to break away from many of
the restraints imposed on armies during the eighteenth
century
.
The rapid expansion of the military manpower base
represented by the growth of nationalism in France produced
a serious imbalance in the international system. Still it
was possible that the international system could have
survived with this imbalance had the French maintained the
international perspective and cosmopolitan outlook of the
ancien regime. However, the combination of nationalism and
ideology dramatically affected the conduct of international
relations. The French ideas of social equality, political
rights and economic liberalism challenged the eighteenth
century aristocratic order and undermined the diplomacy that
was based on conservative social principles. This division
was exacerbated by the infusion of French nationalism as it
now became standard practice to abolish the internal
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constitution of conquered states and replace it with the new
principles espoused by the revolution.
The defeat of the allies by the French in the War of the
First Coalition marked the end of the eighteenth century
international system. The period of limited ends and
limited means had come to a close as the French Republic/
filled with self confidence and self righteousness, embarked
on a mission to remake the whole of Europe in its image.
Stability would only return to the international system
after French nationalism had been transplanted to the rest
of Europe, establishing a balance of resources available to
both the French and the allies. Additionally, the allies
had to overcome their traditional methods of conducting
diplomacy and war that generally stressed separate aims, and
instead build a mechanism upon which unity of purpose
existed. It was only after these events occurred that peace
and tranquility would return to the European continent.
E. SUMMARY
The breakdown of the international system during the
French Revolution was the result of many factors, however,
it appears that a few key factors contributed significantly
to this breakdown. The first factor was a breakdown in the
stability of the ruling elites in Europe. This began first
in France as the product of the domestic turmoil that
undermined the monarchy, and then expanded to the German
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principalities with the abolishment by France of feudal
privileges in Alsace. Elite stability was further
undermined by the rhetorical proclamations and declarations
issued by both the revolutionaries and the monarchs of
Europe, as both sides sought to re-establish their own
systems by threatening to destroy the other's. These
actions planted the seeds for the ideological struggle that
would soon develop.
A second factor, and one that encompasses the entire
revolutionary period, is the failure of the
non-revolutionary powers of Europe to adjust to a
revolutionary France as the allies continued to operate
along classic eighteenth century military-diplomatic lines.
Since France had already renounced a great majority of the
principles that comprised the foundation of the
international system through the abolishment of feudal
privileges, the Declaration of the Fights of Man, and the
renunciation of "all wars of conquest", the allied actions
provided feedback to France that served to further
revolutionize French society. The French revolutionaries
were able to point out that the monarchical system was
directly opposed to the liberal reforms of France, adding
credence to the assertions that the dynastic system was
inherently repressive. Had the allies more fully realized
the changes that revolutionary France posed to the
international system, they could have either tacitly
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accepted the Revolution and attempted to reach an
accommodation with France, something not out of the realm of
the possible in the early stages of the French Revolution,
or they could have better coordinated their efforts to
defeat France. The allied actions during this critical
period illustrates the limits of the preexisting
statesmanship during periods of revolutionary change.
Third, as during previous periods of instability in
Europe, conflict had once again erupted in the center of
Europe. Although this may seem like a trivial point, it is
tremendously important because of the fact that any conflict
on the continent affected the balance amongst the powers and
therefore the threat of horizontal escalation was much
greater. The period of colonization and expansion was
temporarily ended as once again the major powers were
entangled on the continent. The relief valve for the
European powers was now removed, and the continent suffered
terribly for it.
Fourth, the force of ideology became a driving factor in
international relations. The new ideology was important
because it destroyed the commonality of outlook amongst the
ruling elites and hampered their ability to reach agreements
and consensus regarding international relations as both
sides perceived the world in a fundamentally different way.
A fifth factor was the emergence of nationalism. This
factor was important because it allowed France to expand its
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resources base beyond the point that the international
system could balance. French nationalism produced a
tremendous imbalance in the international system, an
imbalance which had to be corrected before stability could
be restored.
The combination of ideology and nationalism produced a
sixth factor, namely the loss of internationalist
perspective. France was no longer concerned with
maintaining the balance in Europe, but instead sought to
reshape Europe in its own image. The cosmopolitan nature of
eighteenth century Europe had been destroyed and was
replaced by an increasingly nationalist one.
Finally, the period of the French Revolution was
characterized by a diplomacy that consisted of unlimited
ends pursued with enormously expanded means. The
constraints placed on the dynastic rulers by the eighteenth
century international system had been removed through the
development of nationalism and ideology, making the pursuit
of grander goals more achievable, particularly from the
French perspective.
The destruction of the international system and the
violence that coincided with it was the result of the
presence of all these factors. Individual factors, although
capable of producing instability by themselves, could not
have had the dramatic affect on the international system
that the combination noted above created.
71
1 Crane Brinton, A Decade of Revolution 1789-1799 , vol.
11 of The Rise c Modern Europe , ed . William L. Langer (New
York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1934), 72-3.
Georges Lefebvre, The French Revolution from its
Origins to 1793 , vol. 1, (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1962), 183.
3 Ibid.
E. Wangermann, "The Habsburg Possessions and
Germany," The American and French Revolutions 1763-90 , ed
.
A. Goodwin, vol. 8 of The New Cambridge Modern History , gen




7Brinton, A Decade of Revolution 1789-1799 , 180-1.
8 Ibid., 83.
Q .Geoffrey Bruun , "The Balance of Power During the
Wars, 1793-1814," War and Peace in an Age of Upheaval
1793-1830
, ed . C. W. Crawley, vol. 9 of The New Cambridge
Modern History , gen ed . J. P. T. Bury (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1957), 250-5.
Kyung-Won Kim, Revolution and International System ,
(New York: New York University Press, 1970), 23.
!1 Brinton, A Decade of Revolution 1789-1799 , 47.12. .
A. Goodwin, "Reform and Revolution in France:
October 1789-February 1793," The American and French
Revolutions 1763-90 , ed . A. Goodwin, vol. 8 of The New
Cambridge Modern History
, gen ed . J. P. T. Bury (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1957), 687-9.
13 Ibid., 689.
Lefebvre, The French Revolution from its Origins to
1793 , 206.
1 s Goodwin, "Reform and Revolution in France: October
1789-February 1793," 693.
16 Ibid.








1 Q .3 vre, The French Revolution from its Origins to
20 Ibid., 226.
21 Brinton, A Decade of Revolution 1789-1799 , 55.
9 9
^Lefebvre, The French Revolution from its Origins to
1793 , 228-9.
Kim, Revolution and International System , 38.
24 Ibid., 40.
Goodwin, "Reform and Revolution in France: October
1789-February 1793," 703.
9 f)Lefebvre, The French Revolution from its Origins to
1793 , 234-5.
97 .
R. R. Palmer, The Age of the Democratic Revolution A
Political History of Europe and America, 1760-1800 , vol . 1
,
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), 37.
9 ft Theodore Ropp, War in the Modern World
,
(New York:
Collier Books, 1985), 106.
9QLefebvre, The French Revolution from its Origins to
1793 , 243.
30Ropp, War in the Modern World , 107.
Bruun , "The Ealance of Power During the Wars,
1793-1814," 254.
32 . ...Leonard W. Cowie, Documents and Descriptions in
European History 1714-1815
, (London: Oxford University
Press, 1967), 166.
Kim, Revolution and International System , 45.
34Goodwin, "Reform and Revolution in France: October
1789-February 1793," 709-10.
Lefebvre, The French Revolution from its Origins to
1793 , 277.
36 Ropp, War in the Modern World , 109.
73
37Brinton, A Decade of Revolution 1789-1799 , 128.
Peter Alter, Nationalism , (London: Edward Arnold,
1989), 39.
Peter Paret, "Napoleon and the Revolution in War,"
Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear
Age, ed . Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1986), 125.
74
IV. EUROPE BETWEEN REVOLUTIONS: A RETURN TO STABILITY
Restoring stability and a balance of power in Europe was
one of the primary goals of the leaders and diplomats that
gathered in Vienna periodically from October 1814 thru June
1815. The statesmen of Europe, however, had another and
more important goal, namely moving past a mere ending of
hostilities to devise a system that would prevent future
conflict. This goal was alluded to by Prince Clemens von
Metternich of Austria, one of the leading statesmen and
chief architects of the Congress of Vienna when he stated:
"On this occasion, peace had already been made and the
parties meet as friends who, though differing in their
interests, wish to work together towards the conclusion and
affirmation of the existing treaty."
A. THE RESTORATION OF COOPERATION AMONG THE POWERS
The cooperation that was necessary to form a "Concert of
Europe" began to form in the winter of 1812-1813 following
Napoleon's retreat from Moscow. By this stage of the
Napoleonic Wars the statesmen of Europe had come to realize
that only a unity of effort and war aims would result in the
defeat of a resource and population rich France. Despite
this realization, the continental powers were already
experiencing strains in their relationship as their
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interests conflicted over the division of the war spoils and
the balance of power. Alexander of Russia sought to
establish a united and autonomous kingdom of Poland out of
the territories formerly partitioned between Russia, Austria
and Prussia. Prussia would be compensated with territory
in Saxony, and Austria would be free to annex territories in
Italy. Alexander's grand design may have been achievable
except for the fact that Alexander had intended to maintain
a protectorate over the Polish state, a situation that was
totally unacceptable to Austria. Although Alexander did not
specifically announce his intentions, Austria was keenly
aware of Russian designs and warned Berlin "If the Polish
question remains unsettled, there is the danger that we may
exchange the yoke of Napoleon for the yoke of Alexander."
To avoid alienating Austria and undermining the formation
of a new coalition against France, Russia and Prussia signed
the Treaty of Kalisch on 20 February 1813, an extremely
vague document that made no mention of territorial divisions
although it served to unify the Russian and Prussian effort
against France.
Although Metternich felt that Napoleon's retreat from
Moscow marked the beginning of the end of French domination
on the continent, Austria remained uncommitted to the
Russian-Prussian alliance. Metternich desired to postpone
Austria's intervention until it would have the most impact,
and therefore obtain the greatest advantages for Austria.
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Metternich's opportunity arose in the summer of 1813
following the battles at Bautzen and Wurschen where
Napoleon's forces defeated the allied forces and forced
their retreat. Following these victories Napoleon undertook
an action that he later concluded was one of his worst
blunders when he agreed to an armistice at Poischwitz.
Although both sides were exhausted and in need of
reinforcements, Napoleon's enemies were in considerably
worse condition than the French. The armistice allowed
Russia and Prussia to obtain a subsidy treaty with England
at Feichenback on 15 June as well as securing Metternich as
mediator
.
Metternich had long hoped for a general peace that would
establish an equilibrium in Europe, for it was the only way
for Austria to secure its national interests. In the Treaty
of Feichenbach, Austria pledged to join the war against
France if Napoleon refused to accept the following four
conditions by 20 July: the dissolution of the Duchy of
Warsaw; the enlargement of Prussia; the return of Tllyria to
Austria; the restoration of Hamburg and Luebeck as free
cities. Metternich believed that these conditions were
essential to establishing a balance of power on the European
continent, and if Napoleon refused, the incompatability of
French aims with a system of equilibrium would have been
demonstrated. Metternich's desire for a diplomatic
restoration of the balance of power failed when the Congress
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at Prague collapsed on 11 August 1813 and the next day
Austria declared war on France.
The allied armies, supported by English subsidies,
achieved a decisive victory over Napoleon at the Battle of
Leipzig from 16-19 October 1813. Napoleon's defeat at
Leipzig resulted in a new set of problems for Metternich and
the equilibrium of Europe. Continued defeats suffered by
France would gravely disturb Metternich's grand design for a
balance of pover on the continent and risk the replacing of
French dominance with that of Russia. In an effort to save
Saxony and Poland, Metternich succeeded in securing an
allied peace proposal that would have allowed France to
maintain its natural boundaries of the Rhine, the Alps, and
the Pyrenees. England did not support the "Frankfurt
proposals," however, and had Napoleon accepted them he may
have been able to dissolve the alliance. Napoleon did not
believe, however, that the allies possessed the resolve
necessary to continue their efforts, and as a result he
postponed making a decision on the proposals.
At the end of 1813, despite the military successes
achieved by the alliance against Napoleon, the cohesiveness
of the alliance was in jeopardy. Metternich desired a
strong France to act as a counter to Russia, and although
England also sought to restore an equilibrium on the
continent, it would not support any French territorial gains
beyond those of "ancient" France nor allow negotiation over
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maritime rights. Prussia was willing to allow Alexander's
grand design for Poland to occur provided that it was
compensated with Saxony, but Austria was opposed to any
expansion of Russia to the west as well as Prussian
expansion into Germany. To prevent the breakup of the
coalition against France, England's foreign minister Lord
Castlereagh hurried to the continent to consult with the
all ies
.
Castlereagh ' s success in maintaining the alliance was
perhaps more attributable to the events that took place from
January to March 1814 than to his diplomatic talents, but
still his contribution cannot be overlooked. England's
insular position from the continental problems placed it in
the unique position to play the role of a power balancer
among the allies. Additionally, since England's interest in
establishing an equilibrium on the continent paralleled
those of Austria, Metternich could now count on support to
oppose Russian and Prussian designs on Poland and Saxony,
although this required Metternich to support English goals
regarding the areas of Luxemburg, Mainz and the Netherlands.
Although an accommodation with Austria was possible/
achieving an agreement with Alexander of Russia was much
more difficult since Russian designs on Poland, as well as
Alexander's desire to place Bernadotte of Sweden on the
throne of France were contrary to the interests of England.
Fortunately the tide of the war temporarily shifted against
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the allies when they were forced to divide themselves
because of difficulties with supply and geography. The
division of the allied effort allowed Napoleon to achieve
victories at Champaubert, Montmirail, Chateau-Thierry and
Vauchamps from 10-15 February and at Nangis and Montereau on
17-18 February. These victories worried Alexander enough
that he was now more willing to reach a formal agreement
with the allies to secure Napoleon's defeat.
On 9 March 1814 Castlereagh achieved his goal of a
consolidating alliance when the allies signed the Treaty of
Chaumont whereby each power promised to "...keep 150,000 men
in active service during the present war, and they pledged
themselves not to make peace except with common consent."
This treaty served to hold the alliance together and ensure
the defeat of Napoleon, however, the treaty went farther
than previous diplomatic initiatives by achieving an
agreement between the powers to protect Europe against every
attempt which France might make "...to infringe the order of
things resulting from such pacification..." that might arise
for the next twenty years. Although this treaty ensured
the eventual military defeat of France, it did not address
the general settlement of reconguered territories following
the allied victory. This limitation, however, should not
diminish the significance of the treaty as it laid the
groundwork for the formation of the Concert of Europe.
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B. THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA: A RETURN TO STABILITY
Following the abdication of Napoleon on 1 1 April and the
signing of the First Treaty of Paris on 30 May, the
victorious allies decided to hold a congress at Vienna to
resolve the territorial issues that arose from the newly
liberated areas. The settlement that emerged from the
Congress of Vienna has often been said to have rested on
three principles: compensation for the victors, legitimacy,
and the balance of power. These principles played an
important role in ensuring the peace in Europe, but they
were not the only factors at work.
The triumph of conservatism over revolutionary
liberalism resulted in a return to the commonality of
outlook amongst the ruling elites of Europe. The widely
divergent ideological views that characterized the French
revolutionary period were dramatically reduced.
Additionally, although the leading statesmen of Europe were
still concerned with protecting their countries' interests,
they all realized that their countries could only benefit
through stability in Europe. Even England's Lord
Castlereagh possessed Europeanist views, and although not as
strong as that of Metternich, they were still significantly
different from those of traditional English isolationists.
The commonality of outlook and the internationalist
perspective of the statesmen at the Congress of Vienna was
expressed in the Quadruple Alliance signed on 20 November
1815.
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The Quadruple Alliance, built upon the principles
established in the Treaty of Chaumont, reflected the
internationalist perspective of Europe's leading statesmen.
Not only did the treaty guard against a resurgent France,
but at the insistence of Lord Castlereagh, the
representatives of the signatory powers of Russia, Prussia,
Austria and England agreed to meet periodically to discuss
common interests and problems. Besides reflecting the
desire of the major powers to cooperate on mutual concerns
and interests, the treaty also showed concern for Europe's
minor states. According to Castlereagh, the treaty was
intended "...not only as a systematic pledge of persevering
concert amongst the leading Powers, but a refuge under which
all the minor States, especially those on the Rhine, may
look forward to find their security upon the return of peace
relieved of the necessity of seeking a compromise with
France . "
'
The Quadruple Alliance modified the traditional balance
of power system that had evolved during the eighteenth
century. The system that had been based on calculations of
material power now also relied upon a new ideological
harmony of self-conscious conservatism to assure the
peace. Liberalism would be opposed before it could lead
to a change in the material position of the European powers.
Although this was originally conceived as a means to oppose
any resurgence of liberalism in France, it was soon expanded
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to support opposition to liberalism wherever it occurred in
Europe. It is interesting to note that one of the chief
proponents of this conceptualization was Lord Castlereagh
who drafted Article VI of the Treaty which called for the
periodic Congresses "...for the consideration of the
measures which shall be considered the most salutory for the
repose and prosperity of nations .. .and the peace of
QEurope." This type of policy was clearly contradictory
of English traditions and liberalism that generally
prevented interference in the domestic affairs of other
states as well as avoiding continental complications, and
demonstrated the ideological difference that existed between
the English Cabinet and Castlereagh. According to
Kissinger, England only approved the treaty because its
implications were beyond the imagination of the members of
the Cabinet. The differences that existed between
Castlereagh and the English Cabinet would later serve to
weaken the Congress system.
In addition to a return to a relatively heterogeneous
ideology amongst the ruling elites of Europe, the statesmen
at the Congress of Vienna suppressed the emergence of
nationalism in Central Europe. The dream of a united
Germany found no favor among the decision makers at Vienna.
Although the Vienna Congress resulted in the establishment
of 39 independent German states, a considerable
consolidation from the over 300 political units that
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constituted Germany before the French Revolution, this
increased centralization was the result of the desire to
prevent the small principalities from gravitating into the
French orbit and creating instability in Central Europe.
Similarly, the politically disunited Italian peninsula,
which Metternich alluded to as merely "a geographical
expression", was left divided by the peacemakers. This
arrangement, coupled with the powerful position of Austria
on the peninsula, was deemed necessary to remove the
likelihood of any future attempt by France to interfere on
1 2the peninsula.
The combination of legitimacy, ideological similarity
and suppressed nationalism resulted in a restoration of
elite stability throughout Europe. This stability was
further reinforced by the concepts embedded in the Quadruple
Alliance regarding intervention to halt threats to the peace
- this meant that the princes and rulers of both the great
and lesser powers could once again feel secure from both
domestic and foreign threats. This contributed
significantly to the stability in Europe following the
Napoleonic Wars.
C. THE FUNCTIONING CONCERT
The harmony that existed among the allies following the
Congress of Vienna and the Second Paris Peace Treaty did not
last long in its purest form. At the first post war meeting
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between the powers, the Congress of Aix-la-Chapel le , which
lasted from September to November 1818, the sovereigns and
ministers met to bring a formal end to the military
occupation of France, settle debts, and re-admit France to
the group of great powers. Despite the fact that the
Congress accomplished much useful work, it also marked the
beginning of a rift between the liberal democratic power of
England and the autocratic power of Russia, while Metternich
of Austria attempted to mediate between the two.
The rift that developed between England and Russia was
mainly the result of the differences that existed in the
structures of society and government of the two powers.
Although in the period immediately following the Napoleonic
Wars, England entered into a period of conservatism as
evidenced by such reactionary measures as the prohibition of
public meetings and suspension of the writ of habeas corpus
following the murder of a gunsmith proprietor in November
1816 at Spa Fields, the fundamental structure of English
institutions were still liberal, and this significantly
limited the range of options available to English statesmen.
Alexander of Russia faced no such constraints from the
autocratic structure of Russian society, and therefore he
was relatively unlimited in his policy options.
Alexander's relative freedom from domestic constraints
in international affairs was demonstrated at the Congress of
Aix-la-Chapelle when he proposed a new Alliance Solidaire
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that was designed to strengthen the Holy Alliance and would
have guaranteed not only each powers territories and
possessions, but the existing form of government that had
been established. This proposal would have established a
tight organization of Europe and would have permitted a
virtually unlimited right of intervention by the powers in
the internal affairs of others. Alexander's scheme was
dismissed brusquely by Castlereagh, whose policies had
already been attacked in Parliament for their leniency
towards Russia. Additionally, Canning, as well as other
members of the Cabinet, were already raising objections to
England's entanglements in continental affairs.
Castlereagh ' s opposition to Alexander's proposal was
supported by Metternich but for different reasons. Although
Metternich was not opposed in principle to a scheme that
guaranteed the existing order, he had no intention of
allowing Russia a voice in every European concern or of
making Austria's policy dependent on Alexander's consent.
Still, Metternich desired to keep his Russian options open
and ensure England's continued involvement on the continent/
and therefore he persuaded the Tsar that his proposal was
unnecessary because the Holy Alliance ensured that the
various governments of Europe were guided by common
principles. Metternich's logic was successful in inducing
Alexander to withdraw his proposal and to avert a




The Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle , despite its success in
concluding the occupation of France and re-integrating it
back into the European system through the Quintuple Alliance
in ]818, demonstrated the fundamental differences that
existed amongst the allies. England moved back towards a
more traditional isolationist policy and made it clear that
England would only become involved on the continent to
prevent the recurrence of French aggression or in times of
great emergency. The continental powers of Russia and
Austria, however, -were much more concerned with preventing
conflicts from occurring. The Central Powers did not enjoy
the internal and external security that England had obtained
as an island and therefore they favored intervention to
maintain the status quo. It is in some ways a historical
curiosity, although not at all surprising, that the country
that produced the statesman who so stridently advocated the
formation of a Congress system also was the country that in
effect eventually doomed the conference system, a pattern
that would be repeated by the United States after World War
I.
The drift away from continental entanglements by
England, although temporarily causing concern to Metternich,
who had relied on England's support to counter Russia's
increased influence in Eastern Europe/ also served to unite
the Central Powers as Metternich realized that cooperation
with Russia would be necessary in the absence of England.
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Metternich • s need for a reconciliation with Russia was
further demonstrated when Alexander opposed the Carlsbad
Decree of 1819 that was supported by Austria and Prussia.
The Decree was designed to suppress liberal political
movements that had emerged in the German states, but
Alexander was unwilling to allow Austria to intervene in
Germany in order to prevent increased Austrian influence in
Germany. Additionally, Alexander's brother-in-law was the
King of Wuerttemberg , one of the rulers who had granted a
liberal constitution that the Carlsbad Decree sought to
overturn. In a show of support for his brother-in-law, in
the fall of 1819 Alexander massed troops in Poland as a
threat to Vienna. " Conflict was only avoided by the
astute diplomacy of Castlereagh. Although Castlereagh could
not openly support Austria's and Prussia 'a interference in
the domestic affairs of other states, he did voice his
approval when he stated: "We are always glad to see evil
germs destroyed without the power to give our approval
openly." Castlereagh was able, however, to turn the
necessity of remaining divorced from entanglements on the
continent into a virtue when he was able to persuade
Alexander that the Carlsbad Decree was only a legitimate
effort to insure domestic tranquility, and no intervention
by the other powers was necessary. Castlereagh made it
clear that he expected the Russians to exercise the same
restraint that England had, and thus the limited
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Anglo-Austro cooperation was able to frustrate Russian
intervention
.
Despite the success that Metternich obtained in
containing Russian expansion into the affairs of Central
Europe, Metternich realized that this was only possible
because Austria was strong enough to reverse the
revolutionary changes taking places in Germany, and England
through inaction was effective in supporting Metternich 's
goals. However, if the conflict had been larger, English
inaction could have resulted in Austria and Russia becoming
involved in conflict over Central Europe. It was this
possibility that made Metternich realize that an eventual
accommodation with Russia was necessary. The social
upheavals that occurred in 1820 and 1821 further
demonstrated Austria's need for cooperation with Russia.
D. THE RISE OF CONSERVATIVE SOLIDARITY IN THE EAST
From 1820 to 1821, four revolutions broke out in Europe
- in Spain (1820), Naples (1820), Fortugal (1820), and
Piedmont (1821). Alexander, who had previously demonstrated
his willingness to accept liberal reforms when they were
introduced as in Germany by the legitimate ruler of the
state, now displayed his unwillingness to allow liberal
reforms to be forced upon a ruler by revolution or the
doctrine of the sovereignty of the people. Metternich, by
contrast, was opposed to liberalism as a matter of principle
regardless of how it became embedded in society.
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The revolution in Spain began on 1 January when unpaid
troops mutinied at Cadiz, and in March the partisans of the
Constitution of 1812 seized power in Madrid. Alexander
wanted allied intervention to restore order, 10 but
Metternich was concerned over maintaining the balance of
power should Russian troops march across Europe. England
was also concerned with Russian intervention, and as a
result the English Cabinet issued their State Paper of 5 May
1820 which stated that the alliance was "...never intended
as a union for the government of the world or for the
superintendence of the internal affairs of other
States.... No country having a representative system of
Government could act upon [such a general principle ]... .We
shall be found in our place when actual danger menaces the
system of Europe: but this country cannot and will not act
upon abstract and speculative principles of precaution. The
Alliance which exists had no such purpose in view in its
i qoriginal formation." This paper rejected collective
intervention unless a direct military danger was imminent,
and although this ran contrary to Metternich's general
doctrine, Metternich acguiesced to isolate Russia.
Although Metternich was able to overlook the situation
in Spain, and the combination of Austria and England was
able to diplomatically restrain Alexander, the uprising in
Naples in July 1820 produced a direct challenge to Austrian
control in Italy. Alexander, appalled by the liberal
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risings called for a formal conference to discuss the
revolutionary problems. This provided a difficult dilemma
for Metternich because he could not idly sit back and watch
conditions deteriorate in Italy as he had in Spain.
Additionally, failure by Austria to act could result in
Russian intervention alone. Finally, England supported
intervention to restore order, but since the uprisings
mainly affected Austria, it only supported intervention by
Austria, both as a means of forestalling Russian advances as
well as a means of saving England from having to reverse the
policy it had announced during the Spanish crises. In an
attempt to reach a compromise agreement, Metternich agreed
to a congress of sovereigns at Troppau, although England
agreed to only send its ambassador at Venice as an observer.
The Congress at Troppau convened on 23 October 1820 and
was essentially a meeting of the three eastern powers of
Austria, Prussia and Russia and marked the beginning of the
cleavage between the conservative powers and England, which
was later jointed by France. Metternich dominated the
conference, but to obtain Alexander's consent to restore
order in Naples, Metternich had to agree that the
intervention would be in the name of the Alliance. This
requirement resulted in the "preliminary protocol" of 19
November which proclaimed: "States which have undergone a
change of government, due to revolution, the results of
which threaten other states, ipso facto cease to be members
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of the European Alliance, and remain excluded from it until
their situation gives guarantee for legal order and
stability. If, owing to such alterations, immediate danger
threaten other states, the powers bind themselves, by
peaceful means, or if need be by arms, to bring back the
70guilty state into the bosom of the Great Alliance."
After completion of the preliminary protocol, it was agreed
that another congress should be held at Laibach in January.
The Congress at Laibach convened on 12 January 1821 and
resulted in the formal empowerment of Austria to put down
the revolution in Italy. The preliminary protocol reached
between the three conservative powers at Troppau, however,
was opposed by England and France, not because they
supported the revolutionary movements, but because they
opposed the principle that the agreement was based upon.
The English government issued a public protest on 19 January
1821, and stated that His Majesty's Government would
"...never consent to charge itself as a member of the
Alliance with the moral responsibility of administering a
general European policy of this description." By the
time of the protest, however, eighty thousand Austrian
troops had marched into Northern Italy and ninety thousand
Russian troops had crossed over into Europe to back up the
Austrian actions.
Despite the English opposition to the "preliminary
protocol", the English were relieved that only Austria, and
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not the Russians or French were authorized to act in Italy.
English support for Austria's actions was demonstrated by
Castlereagh when he remarked to Metternich that "...you
would have done better to have acted first and talked
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afterwards." Thus Metternich's skillful diplomacy had
once again been able to prevent Russian expansion into
Europe, and although England had now effectively withdrawn
from the alliance, this was mainly because of procedural
disputes rather than to opposition of the alliance goals.
Although the Congress at Laibach firmly established
Metternich's position as the leading statesmen of Europe,
during the conference an issue arose that would later break
the solidarity of the conservative eastern powers. In March
1821 a Greek uprising in Moldavia occurred against Ottoman
rule. The uprising placed Alexander in a difficult position
because had he supported the Greek revolutionaries, he may
have been able to gain influence in Turkey and secure
Russian access to the Mediterranean, a long cherished goal.
Supporting the Greeks, however, would have meant violating
the principle that Alexander had espoused regarding the
overthrow of legitimate governments by revolutionaries.
Under strong pressure by Metternich, who realized that any
expansion of Russian political influence to the
Mediterranean would jeopardize English maritime interests
and could lead to conflict, Alexander finally denounced the
revolution, and dismissed his Greek foreign minister who had
been supportive of the Greek uprising.
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By the time the Congress at Laibach ended on 12 May
1821, Metternich had skillfully employed the doctrine of
intervention to ensure the defeat of two revolutionary
movements and further solidified Austria's position in
Italy. Additionally, by using the conservative doctrine to
limit Russian support for the Greeks, Metternich had ensured
that Russian and English interests would not lead to
conflict in the Balkans. Although Metternich had now
achieved his goals in Italy, the revolution in Spain was
still unresolved. Alexander still wanted to intervene, or
as a minimum to authorize the French to intervene to reverse
the revolution. Metternich avoided any committment to
action in Spain in order not to force England into
opposition, although at the final declarations at Laibach
the eastern powers restated their commitment in principle to
the doctrine of Troppau . And, finally, these powers also
agreed to participate in another conference the next year to
discuss progress in Italy and review the situation in Spain
and Fortuga 1
.
The final full gathering of the European concert of
powers occurred at Verona in October 1822. The revolution
in Spain was still a source of concern to Metternich, who
realized that England's support against Russian intervention
would be necessary to thwart Alexander's intentions. The
likelihood of England's support was greatly diminished
however when Castlereagh, who had planned to attend the
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conference in person, ended his life on 12 August.
Castlereagh was not replaced until five weeks later by
George Canning, and the Duke of Wellington was named to take
Castlereagh ' s position at Verona in the interim. Canning's
appointment had a profound affect on the alliance. Although
he was politically experienced and well informed in foreign
affairs, he did not posses the European outlook of
Castlereagh but instead favored the traditional English
isolationist role. As England's support for involvement on
the continent declined, Metternich was gradually forced to
give in to the demands of Alexander for action in Spain, and
as a result Austria ended up supporting French intervention
2?
on the Iberian peninsula. Although England's active
participation in the alliance had already ended, the French
intervention in Spain caused England to openly break with
the alliance. Canning perhaps best summed up the English
attitude toward foreign affairs after the Congress at Verona
when he remarked "For Alliance, read England, and you have
the clue to my policy. Every country for itself and God for
us all." 24
Although England had now essentially returned to its
insular position, English interests on the continent still
required England to periodically assume an active role to
safeguard its interests. The greatest danger to England's
interest would have been the emergence of a Franco-Russo
alliance which would have dominated the continent.
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Fortunately for England, the necessity of English diplomatic
maneuvering to prevent a Franco-Eusso rapprochement had been
substantially reduced by the congresses of Troppau, Laibach
and Verona which effectively transferred Austria's
dependence from England to Russia. Austria had now assumed
the role of maintaining the balance of power on the
continent. It did so by deterring French attempts at
hegemony with the Austro-Eusso entente and preventing
Eussian expansion through the skillful diplomacy of
Metternich. Despite Austria's mediating role, however,
England still remained engaged on the continent. In April
of 1823, when 100,000 French soldiers crossed the Pyrenees
to suppress the Spanish revolt, Canning intervened
diplomatically to ensure that the French occupation was only
temporary, that the territorial integrity of Portugal would
be respected, and that France would make no attempt to
recover the rebel Spanish colonies. Despite the
relative success of the English diplomatic efforts, the
Spanish crises revealed the weakness of England's insular
position. Without the support of another power England was
virtually powerless to halt the actions of one of the great
powers, and thus Canning realized England would have to
cooperate with the conservative eastern powers where their
interests clashed with those of England rather than oppose
them.
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E. THE NEAR EAST HOLDS THE CONCERT TOGETHER
England's cooperation with Russia was the result of the
continued chaos in the Balkans between the Greeks and the
Turks. The inability of the Turks to rapidly defeat the
Greek uprising was a source of concern because both England
and Russia were sympathetic to the Greek cause, albeit for
different reasons. The English were sympathetic to the
Greeks, who were assumed to be the heirs of ancient Greek
civilization, and as a result they recognized the insurgent
Greeks as belligerents in 1823, and in 1824 delivered the
first of a series of English loans thereby making themselves
the financiers of the revolution. Russia, by contrast, was
sympathetic toward the Greeks because of common religious
beliefs and the Russian position as protectors of Eastern
Orthodoxy. The common concern by the English and Russians
for the Greeks resulted in a conference of the powers at St.
Petersburg in 1824 to discuss Alexander's plan for creating
three autonomous Greek principalities. The other powers
were opposed to this policy as it was seen as an attempt to
weaken Turkey and strengthen Russian influence by
establishing client states. Metternich was adamantly
opposed to any such plan, even after the Turkish Sultan's
vassal Mehemet Ali, the ruler of Egypt, began to dispatch
forces to Turkey. The failure of another conference at St.
Petersberg in 1825 resulted in Russia cooperating directly
with England.
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The cooperation that developed between Russia and
England in the Near East resulted in the Anglo-Russian
Protocol of 4 April 1826. The Protocol called for the
Greeks to remain a dependency of the Ottoman Empire and pay
an annual tribute to the Porte, in exchange for which the
Greeks would enjoy complete liberty of conscience, freedom
of commerce and exclusive conduct of their own internal
government. Additionally, Article III left open the
possibility of independent intervention by Russia although
the terms of the arrangements specified in Article I were to
be the basis for any reconciliation of the intervention.
The Anglo-Russian Protocol formed the basis for the
Treaty of London signed on 6 July 1827 by the English,
French and Russian governments. The French had become
involved in the Near East affair mainly because it saw the
possibility of intervention in Greece as a means to
demonstrate their recovery in the Mediterranean as well as
maintaining good relations with Russia in hope of breaking
free of the constraints imposed upon the European powers.
The three powers attempted to force an armistice on the
Ottoman Empire and implement the Anglo-Russian Protocol by
enforcing a blockade of the Morea . However, on October 20,
1827 the allied fleets trapped the Turkish navy at the Bay
of Navarino, and in the confusion fighting erupted and the
Turkish fleet was destroyed. When word of the conflict at
Navarino reached Constantinople, the Turks proclaimed a holy
war against Russia.
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The Russo-Turkish War commenced in April 1828, and
although the strength of the Ottoman Empire had been in
decline, it was not an easy victory for the Russian troops.
By August of 1829, despite stiff resistance, the Russian
armies had marched down the Balkan peninsula and laid seige
to the city of Adrianople. Russian troops were now within
striking distance of Constantinople and thus raised the
possibility that Russia would conquer the city and destroy
the empire. The French viewed the Russian military
victories and possible territorial expansion as an
opportunity to link the war in the Near East with the
rivalries that existed between the powers in Europe. Just
before the signing of the Treaty of Adrianople on 14
September 1829, the French prime minister Polignac proposed
to the Russians a plan for territorial revision that would
have granted Russia extensive territorial gains in Turkey in
exchange for French gains at the expense of the united
Netherlands. Despite Russia's military conquests however,
Nicholas was in no position to support a proposal that would
have destroyed the agreements reached at Vienna.
Additionally, continued Russian presence in the Near East
would have resulted in strong opposition from England and
Austria, and therefore Nicholas did not support the French
proposal
.
Although the French proposal had been rejected by
Russia, the French diplomatic initiatives demonstrated that
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France was no longer content with the provisions of the
agreements reached at Vienna. The French desire to assume a
greater role in European politics and break free from the
constraints placed on it by the other great powers was
further demonstrated when, on the pretext of suppressing
piracy in the western Mediterranean, the French bombarded
and occupied Algiers. The renewed aggressiveness of
French foreign policy caused alarm. Fears of French
imperialism re-emerged, particularly in England where French
actions were seen as a direct threat to English naval
supremacy. The remaining powers were not overly concerned,
however, because the center of the European continent
remained relatively stable. This condition changed
dramatically however when revolution once again swept
through France in July of 1830.
F. REVOLUTION RETURNS IN FRANCE
The revolution in France resulted in the replacement of
Charles X with the Duke of Orleans, Louis Fhilippe, and once
again raised the possibility of revolution and war in
Europe. The revolution presented another set of challenges
to both England and the eastern autocratic powers. Although
all the powers were concerned with the possibility of
renewed French aggression, Metternich was fearful that any
joint allied intervention would result in Russian armies
marching into Europe. Similarly, Prussia had no desire to
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see its lands turned into a battlefield, and therefore
Frederick William III was cautious not to advocate an
aggressive response. Finally, England was in the midst of
liberal reform as the Tory government came under
increasing attack as an aristocratic system. When demands
for liberal domestic reforms increased, some of this liberal
sentiment spilled over into foreign policy. As a result
England became relatively more sympathetic to the French
cause, although to state that it fully supported France
would be untrue. Only Nicholas of Russia desired to take
dramatic action, but without the support of the other
powers, he could accomplish little unilaterally. The
combination of these circumstances resulted in Metternich,
in consultation with Nesselrode of Russia, issuing the
"Chiffon of Carlsbad" whereby the two governments agreed not
to intervene in French internal affairs unless France
on
inaugurated an active policy abroad.
In an effort to preserve the peace, England recognized
Louis Philippe as the legitimate constitutional ruler of
France and the Austrians and the Prussians quickly followed
suit. The Austrians hoped that by recognizing the new king
that France would recognize Austria's dominant position in
Italy while Prussia hoped to ensure peace on the Rhine.
Nicholas of Russia, however, did not adopt the conciliatory
attitude of the other powers but instead undertook
significant measures against the revolutionary movement.
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Although these vere largely ineffective without the
cooperation of the other powers, Nicholas' actions
significantly undermined the Franco-Russian relationship
established during the crises in the Near East.
The fall of the Bourbon monarchy in France increased the
pressure for reforms in England with the revolution being
warmly received by the Whigs and radicals. In November
1830, the Tory government was replaced by a Whig government
committed to parliamentary reform. Although England was
still concerned with containing France within its 1815
borders, Metternich and many other European conservatives
viewed the English reforms as an onslaught on the
established order. Liberal politicians were quick to point
out that the great powers were now aligned into two rival
groups: an eastern autocratic alignment and a western
liberal entente.
The formation of two rival groups, although in some ways
correct, was really illusory. England was able to exploit
French fears of isolation and encirclement to render France
subservient to England's interest, while in the east Austria
and Prussia were hostage to their perception of Russian
might. Additionally, since England, Austria and Prussia
were always guarding against possible Russian expansion,
they still shared mutual interests. Finally, England,
Austria, Prussia and Russia still feared French aggression
and therefore shared common interests as well. Thus,
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although it is true that both England and France felt
compelled to resist absolutism, the commonality of interests
among the victors of Waterloo dominated over any ideological
groupings that they may have been placed into.
Perhaps the most important factor that determined
European relations after 1830 and divided Europe into two
opposing camps was the events in the Near East. In late
1831 Mehemet Ali, the pasha of Egypt/ sought to extend his
control over Palestine/ Syria and Arabia. The Egyptian
forces were opposed by the Ottoman Sultan Mahmud IT,
however, by December of 1832 the Egyptian forces had won a
series of victories and were threatening to overrun Asia
Minor and take Constantinople itself. Austria promoted
collective action by the powers to preserve the integrity of
the Ottoman Empire, but when discussions between Austria and
England bogged down, the Sultan requested aid from Russia.
The Russian intervention in February 1833 saved the Ottoman
Empire, but prior to the Russian withdrawal the tsar
32
concluded a treaty at Unkiar Skelessi on 8 July 1833.
The treaty gave Russia expanded influence in the Ottoman
Empire, a serious blow to England's interest.
The Russian diplomatic victory also increased England's
suspicions of Austria's policy as Palmerston believed,
although probably incorrectly, that Metternich was privy to
Russian intentions and had deliberately misled England.
England's suspicion increased however when Nicholas and the
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Austrian Emperor Francis and Metternich met at
Muenchengraetz and concluded a formal alliance that
recognized the right of any sovereign to summon the aid of
the eastern powers if threatened by revolution.
The solidarity of the eastern powers to put down the
liberal movement all over Europe was a concern to the
liberal English ministry as well as France. To counter the
conservative eastern powers, England, France, Portugal and
Spain established a quadruple alliance in 1834. The
alliance, although formed to safeguard the Portuguese and
Spanish queens from the reactionary pretenders Dom Miguel
and Don Carlos respectively, became an effective
counterbalance to the eastern powers. According to
Palmerston the treaty established "...a quadruple alliance
among the constitutional states of the West, which will
serve as a powerful counterpoise to the Holy Alliance of the
"3*3
East." Although liberals throughout Europe viewed the
treaty as an organization against autocratic power, the
ideological differences that existed were still subordinated
to geographical interests, particularly in the Near East.
G. THE RETURN OF THE EASTERN QUESTION
The conflict of interests that resulted in the Near
Eastern Crises of 1839-41 demonstrated the relative
unimportance of ideological views amongst the powers.
Palmerston believed that Turkey should undergo an extensive
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program of reform to revitalize and transform it into a
modern state able to look after its own interests and be
released from its dependence on Russia. Additionally,
England was opposed to any Egyptian expansion into Turkey.
Russia, although it shared no desire to strengthen Turkey,
also opposed Egyptian expansion. The desire to halt
Egyptian expansion therefore provided a common interest
between Russia and England in the Near East.
Although England and France shared elements of a common
ideology, French policies in the Near East diverged from
those of England. Throughout the 1830s, following the
French move into Algiers, France had pursued a policy of
expansion in North Africa, and by the late 1830s French
policy in the Mediterranean was decidedly anti-English. The
French believed additionally that a close relationship with
Egypt was an integral part of their Mediterranean policy.
Thus when conflict broke out between Turkey and Egypt in
June 1839, France was supportive of Egypt while Russia and
England supported Turkey.
The Egyptians quickly inflicted heavy losses on the
Turkish forces at Nazib, and when combined with the death of
the Sultan Mahmud II, Turkey was in a state of panic.
Metternich seized the opportunity to regain the diplomatic
initiative, and through discussions with the great power
ambassadors in Vienna, he was able to issue a collective
note on 27 July that informed the sultan that the powers
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were preparing to intervene. Nicholas had not approved of
the action although he did not reject it because he realized
that any unilateral action by Russia could result in war
with England. Additionally, Anglo-Russo cooperation
presented an opportunity for Russia to separate the
Anglo-French entente, thereby isolating France, the country
that Nicholas considered the breeding ground of revolution
in Europe.
France's support of Egypt, and its desire not to see
Egypt deprived of its gains resulted in the isolation of
France. France's isolation was shortlived, however, as the
French began to threaten war against England and on the
Rhine if the coercion of Egypt continued. Since ustria and
Prussia would bear the brunt of any French aggression,
Metternich used his influence to bring France back into the
concert. Similarly, Louis Philippe also sought to end
France's brief isolation, and as a result, the Thiers
ministry was abandoned and a new ministry was formed. The
change of government in France, combined with the submission
of Mehemet Ali ended the crises, and the agreement concluded
between the five powers in June 1841 regarding the straits
effectively ended France's isolation.
H. SUMMARY
The international system that existed from 1815 to 1848
was a period characterized by general peace and stability
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throughout Europe. Although the French Revolution and the
resulting Napoleonic Wars had a tremendous influence on the
statesmen of the period, the stability amongst the great
powers of Europe was the result of many of the same factors
that promoted stability in Europe during the eighteenth
century
.
The Congress of Vienna re-established the stability of
the ruling elites of Europe that had been undermined by the
French Revolution. Although the domestic order of Europe
was no longer as highly structured, the fundamental
principles underlying the dynastic order were restored.
Compensating for the decline in the structure of European
society, however, was the general guarantee by the great
powers to protect both one another and the lesser powers
from French expansionist desires. The eastern powers,
additionally, were willing to go beyond merely protecting
one another from French aggression and protect one another
from domestic revolution as well. The combination of these
guarantees produced a period of great elite stability
throughout Europe.
The statesmen at Vienna also made the conscientious
decision to avoid redrawing the map of Europe along
nationalistic lines, thus suppressing any conflicts that may
have developed along these lines, although only temporarily.
Although refusing to accept the new force of nationalism as
a guiding factor in European relations, the great powers,
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nevertheless, vere able to ensure a high degree of
flexibility in the international system.
A third factor that the period from 1815 to 1848 had in
common with the eighteenth century was the relative
unimportance of ideology and the lack of widely divergent
ideological views amongst the ruling elite. Although
England was substantially more liberal than the remainder of
Europe, and after 1830 there was much talk of an
Anglo-French liberal alignment, the ideological differences
between the powers were never important enough to undermine
the general diplomatic relationships between the powers.
Ideological differences never kept any of the powers from
reaching agreements to preserve the peace or the balance of
power as evidenced by the numerous rapprochements between
the powers throughout this period.
A fourth factor was the return to an internationalist
perspective amongst the ruling elites of Europe. The
leaders of the great powers were now much more concerned
with the maintenance of the balance of power on the
continent, and even though the system of congresses had
broken down by 1822, the statesmen of Europe still exhibited
a high degree of awareness in international affairs.
Fifth, the system created at the Congress of Vienna, and
great power action during this period prevented large scale
conflicts from developing in the center of the European
continent. The European powers not only took quick and
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decisive action to stop revolutionary movements that may
have threatened the peace on the continent, they were also
careful to prevent large coalition actions from occurring on
the continent. Limitating coalition actions was
tremendously important in ensuring that great power
rivalries would not erupt over conflicts of interests during
joint actions.
The end product of these conditions, finally, was a
return to a system that could once again be characterized as
one of limited means and limited ends. None of the great
powers was willing to embark upon a continental hegemonic
drive for fear of opposition from the other powers, and all
powers were careful to not endanger another's vital
interests through unilateral action.
The moderate and limited nature of international
diplomacy was once again altered, however, by the
revolutions that swept through Europe in 1848. Although the
level of violence would not approach that of the French
Revolutionary period, the revolutions of 1848 significantly
destabilized the international system.
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V. 1848: THE UNDERMINING OF THE CONCERT OF EUROPE
The liberal, democratic and nationalistic revolutions
that swept across Europe in 1848, although shortlived as
reactionary forces quickly reasserted themselves,
nonetheless had a destabilizing and lasting effect upon the
international system. Both liberal and conservative
ideologies vere undermined by the revolution, leading one
historian to comment that the revolution "...brought about
the end of the world. Being the practical application of an
ideology that sprang from the French Revolution and the
First Empire, it can be said, by its failure, to have
exhausted that ideology. Thus it is an end rather than a
beginning, for subsequent events were the fruit of different
ideas. 1 While it is true that liberal and conservative
ideologies were in some respects discredited, the
revolutions of 1848 had another and more important and
lasting consequence - the triumph of nationalism over
liberalism and its subsequent destructive effects on the
international system as it undermined the principles that
had created stability in Europe during both the eighteenth
century and the period from 1815 to 1848.
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A. THE BACKGROUND CAUSES OF THE REVOLUTIONS
Although it is not necessary to examine in great detail
the background causes of the revolutions, and the fact that
each revolution had its own unigue causes and vas the
product of each country's unigue historical experience, all
the revolutions were influenced by several general
conditions that existed throughout Europe. The first common
factor was the economic crises that resulted from the poor
cereal harvests in 1BA C> and 1846. The ensuing food shortage
contributed to the substantial rise in food prices
throughout Europe, often times by over 50 percent, with
complex affects on commercial, financial and industrial
activity that was already suffering from a cyclical
downswing. Besides the obvious effect that rising food
prices had on the poor people in both town and country, as
larger portions of income were spent by them on foodstuffs,
expenditures on manufactured goods declined, resulting in
the unemployment of both urban and rural industrial workers.
The pre-industr i a 1 subsistence crises, when combined with
the overproduction and underconsumption crises more typical
of an industrial economy, were particularly difficult for
ruling elites to deal with because Europe was in a
transition from a rural and agricultural society to an urban
and industrial one.
The economic crises created a second common factor,
namely the intensification of social problems that had
1 \A
developed as the result of industrialization and population
growth. The expansion of these two areas, and the
urbanization that accompanied them, resulted in a rise in
social tensions that frequently produced strikes,
demonstrations, increased criminality, and food riots such
as the "potato revolt" in Eerlin in 1847. As a result of
these disturbances, the ruling elites were forced to deal
with the problems of maintaining law and order. In addition
to these pressing social problems, the governing elites were
faced with demands from the rising middle class for
concessions regarding censorship, widening of the electoral
franchise and the establishment of representative
assemblies. The middle class was the decisive group in the
revolutionary process because it possessed the
organizational capacity for mobilization of wider circles of
both the bourgeoisie and the masses and could, therefore,
politicize their discontent.
The economic and social problems produced a third common
factor, namely a political crisis. The aristocratic
ministers of the conservative elites feared that concessions
would only open the flood gates to further demands as
occurred in France during the French Revolution, and,
therefore, the ruling elites sought to preserve the status
quo. This reluctance to respond to pressure for change
resulted in growing political polarization. The economic,
social and political crises represents the background causes
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to the revolutions of 1848. The effect that the revolutions
of 18^8 had on the international system must now be
examined
.
B. THE OUTBREAK AND SPREAD OF REVOLUTION ACROSS EUROPE
The first outbreak of revolution occurred in January
1848 in Palermo and vas essentially a separatist movement
2
against rule from Naples, but its impact on the
international system vas minimal. Of decisive importance
vas the revolution that occurred in Faris in February of
1848. In viev of the previously discussed economic, social
and political crises, opposition leaders to the unpopular
Guizot ministry sought to have him replaced by a cabinet
that vould adopt political and social reforms. The
opposition had planned to hold demonstrations on 22 February
1848 near the Champs d' Elysees, but upon learning that the
government had planned to have police disband the
demonstrators, the leaders decided to cancel the
demonstrations. Radical leaders and hard core activists
Alexandre Ledru-Foll in and the poet Alphonse Louis-Marie de
Lamartine, hovever, decided to continue with the
demonstrations
.
The radical demonstrators and police clashed on the
morning of 22 February, and although fighting developed, it
vas only sporadic and the police were able to control the
situation. On 23 February, hovever, the crovds vere larger
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and more aggressive, and the police could not adequately
control the demonstrators. This resulted in the National
Guard being ordered into action. Since the National Guard
was comprised of a large number of the disenchanted and
radical workers, however, the Guard was ineffective as it
began to fraternize with the demonstrators. Faced with
rising opposition Louise Philippe dismissed Guizot in the
afternoon. Guizot's dismissal was too little too late, and
on the evening of 22 February angry mobs and elements of the
police force known as the Municipal Guard, clashed on the
Boulevard des Capucines with 40 to 50 people being killed.
Shortly thereafter the French citizens put up more than 1500
barricades on the Paris streets, and by the afternoon of 24
February a panicked Louise Philippe had abdicated and was in
the process of fleeing the country. Despite the turmoil,
Lamartine was able to declare a republic, establish a
provisional government and install himself as foreign
minister .
When news of the events in France reached the capitals
of Europe, fears of French aggression combined with the
widespread social discontent that already existed to produce
a period of tremendous elite insecurity and tension. The
European monarchs responded by preparing for war. In
Germany troops were mobilized. On 4 March 1848, Prussia
ordered its armed forces to the Rhine and placed them on
alert. Holland and Belgium increased their readiness along
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the French border. On 1 1 March, Tsar Nicholas placed his
armies on a state of alert.
Meanvhile, in Vienna, Metternich embarked on an
aggressive diplomatic campaign to concert vays of preventing
France from once again flooding its neighbors with
revolutionary propaganda. The bourgeoisie in Austria
immediately became convinced that Metternich would launch a
crusade resulting in heavy expenditures and inflation, and
as a result there was a run on the banks in Vienna and other
large cities. This financial panic added to the
instabilities already present within the empire, and allowed
Lajos Kossuth to attack the conservative ministry in a
passionate speech to the Hungarian Diet on ? March in which
he demanded the "...transformation of our present system of
government by committees into a responsible and independent
Hungarian Ministry." Nationalism had now become an issue
in the Habsburg Empire.
Pressure began to mount on France as the diplomacy of
the eastern powers and their military mobilization resulted
in the encirclement of France. In an attempt to prevent
France from being opposed by a hostile Europe, Lamartine
issued his Manifesto to Europe on 4 March 1848 in which he
declared "...the treaties of 1815 have no legal existence in
the eyes of the French republic; nevertheless the
territorial provisions of these treaties are a fact which
the republic admits as a basis and starting point in its
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relations vith other nations. " y Kith this declaration
Lamartine had attempted to appease both the radical elements
of French society by repudiating the treaties of 1815 yet
acknovledging the existence of the balance of power system
and territorial divisions reached at the Congress of Vienna.
Lamartine's declaration, although regarded by many as a
call to war, did offer some diplomatic encouragement to
England which still supported the policy of non-intervention
in domestic affairs. The English foreign secretary
Palmerston used the declaration to encourage the eastern
powers to give France assurances that "...so long as France
is not aggressive, no aggression will be made upon her."
The powers thus had reacted to France in 1848 the same way
that they had in 1830, and it was hoped that the restrained
nature of their reaction would prevent a further
radicali zation of the revolution, and prevent what
Metternich believed would be another attempt at French
hegemony when he compared the events of 1848 to 1791 and
asked "...can 1793 fail to follow?" 9 The cautious
response by the great powers to the events in France, and
the delicate diplomacy conducted by Lamartine, prevented any
contemplated intervention against France. The rapid success
and relative ease with which the French were able to
overthrow their government, however, helped to encourage
the liberal and nationalistic elements throughout Europe to
act against the already unstable conservative elites.
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In Vienna a tense meeting of the Lover Austrian Diet
took place on 1? March as a large crovd of disenchanted
workers and radical students assembled to protest the
current conditions. The subsequent events were similar to
those of Paris. Troops vere called in to clear the streets
and restore order, but in the midst of the general malaise
one detachment of troops opened fire and killed four people
and wounded many others. It may have been possible for
the Emperor Ferdinand to restore order had he been decisive
and authorized Prince Alfred Kindischgraetz to intervene
militarily, but instead Ferdinand had a loss of will and
submitted to the demands of the people that called for the
withdrawal of troops, the arming of the students, and the
resignation of Metternich.
The resignation of Metternich had devastating
consequences for the remainder of Central Europe. In Venice
the Austrian General Zichy rapidly capitulated to a group of
insurgent workers and peasants. Zichy, unsure of his
support from both Austria and from his Italian troops,
believed his situation to be untenable. Zichy's surrender
was followed by the establishment of a Venetian republic led
by Daniel Manin on 17 March. Once again the Austrian
Empire was being threatened with dismemberment by a
nationalist revolution.
On 18 March, inspired by the events in Paris and Vienna,
a revolt against Austrian rule occurred in Milan when a
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crovd of 10,000 petitioned for press freedom, citizens'
militias and the election of a parliament. As in Paris and
Vienna, clashes with troops followed and barricades were
erected. The Austrian commander Radetzky was forced to
retreat after five days of bitter street fighting to a
fortified belt between Lake Como and the Piver Po known as
the Quadrilateral.
The revolutions in Austria, coupled with the Habsburg '
s
difficulties in Italy, also had a significant impact on the
situation in Prussia and the Germanic states. In Berlin a
large crowd gathered at the royal palace to listen to a
royal decree from the king Frederick William TV. Although
the king firmly believed in his divine right to rule, the
decree was moderately liberal in that it promised the
abolition of press censorship, a constitution, convening of
a united diet, and a Prussian leadership committed to work
toward German unity. This last point had important
ramifications for the future of the Vienna settlement.
Prussia's goal of a united Germany represented a desire by
one of the great powers to fundamentally alter the balance
of power in Central Europe, and therefore Prussia's action
represented the beginning of the breakdown of the Vienna
system. Although the breakdown would not be completed for
several years, the action illustrates an important point as
Prussia became more inward looking and less concerned with
maintaining the international system, a pattern that would
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be repeated by the other powers during the revolutionary
period and its aftermath.
Frederick William's decree may have been able to satisfy
the masses, however, when soldiers were seen massed in the
courtyard of the palace, a panic set in amongst the crowd,
and calls for the removal of the army occurred. Frederick
William, upon hearing the growing disenchantment, ordered
his troops to clear the courtyard. Events similar to those
in Faris and Vienna followed, and within a short time
barricades were being resurrected and street fighting
developed . -
~
The government could easily have put down the rebellion,
in fact by the evening of 18 March many of the barricades
had been destroyed by cannon fire and many of the insurgents
arrested. In the outlying districts, however, resistance
still flourished. The army recommended that the king
abandon the city for his palace at Potsdam while the army
blockaded and bombarded the city. This proposed action was
too harsh for the monarch who had no desire to see the
Berlin population repressed over what he considered the work
of foreign agitators. On the morning of 19 March, Frederick
William halted military operations and ordered the removal
of troops from the city. For the next several days, a
period known as the "Berlin Days," the king enacted a number





C. SOURCES OF INSTABILITY IN THE REVOLUTIONARY AFTERMATH
The events of late February and early March had resulted
in the destruction of the alliance of the conservative
eastern powers as veil as the common internationalist
outlook that had existed between them and helped to maintain
the international system. Although there was brief talk of
a formation of a new liberal alliance, particularly from
1 ^Frussia which sought to liberate Poland, the lack of a
common outlook amongst the liberal powers when coupled with
their inability to overcome the limits of their preexisting
dipolomacy prevented a return to a stable international
system. France, despite being strongly positioned to aid
the revolutions in Northern Italy, continued to avoid an
aggressive foreign policy as fears of hostile encirclement
continued to influence the decisions of Lamartine and
others. England, despite its liberal institutions, pursued
a policy of restraining France due to its past experiences
with French hegemony. Prussia sought not only the
liberation of Poland, but also the unification of Germany
under Prussian leadership. The leaders of the multi-ethnic
Austrian Empire were more concerned with preventing the
breakup of the empire by Hungarian, Italian and Czech
separatists, and therefore their energies were mainly
directed inward. The inability of the ruling elites to
achieve an internationalist outlook as well as break free
from their preexisting diplomatic tendencies resulted in
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18^8 becoming "a great moment tragically missed" for the
liberals of Europe.
The lack of a common international perspective among the
elites and their inability to overcome the restraints of the
pre-existing diplomacy, particularly on the part of England
and France, hindered a return to stability in Europe. The
instability of the liberal elites following their rapid
accession to pover also produced instabilities in the
international system. The instability of the elites was
largely brought about by the increased political
mobilization and financial disarray from the revolutions,
coupled with the relatively narrow middle class goals of the
revolutions. These factors contributed significantly to the
resurgence of reactionary forces.
In France, the Provisional Government had established
National Workshops to provide relief to the unemployed
masses. Faced vith a growing budget deficit, however, it
was necessary for the government to raise money through tax
revenues in order to pay the workers. The government was
fearful that the imposition of a new tax on the wealthy
bankers, creditors and manufacturers would endanger state
and commercial credit, and jeopardize a return to financial
prosperity that was deemed necessary to cure the social
problems of France. As a result, the government ended
up increasing direct taxation, mainly through a land tax, by
45 percent. This measure alienated the peasant class as the
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French peasant viewed the Paris proletariat as "...the
spendthrift vho did himself well at his expense." This
sentiment also extended to the middle class and property
owners in France as they increasingly came to view the
unemployed as lazy and worthless.
D. THE CONSERVATIVE REACTION
In view of these conditions it was not surprising that
the elections to the National Assembly held in April 1848
resulted in a decisive victory for the moderate republicans
led by Lamartine who advocated liberal political reforms but
not radical social reforms. The republican victory
increased the tensions in the workshops as the workers
believed that social reforms would not be undertaken. This
in turn raised fears that the workers would unite in a
socialist revolution, and as a result discussions over
dissolution of the workshops dominated the assembly. On 2?
June the conservative catholic Comte de Falloux presented a
decree to dissolve the workshops within three days and send
the workers to either the army or the provinces. Falloux's
plan had already been found out by the workers, and as a
result, as the report was presented in the Assembly, the
workers built barricades throughout the working class
sections of Paris. The streetf ighting that followed during
the "June Days" (23-26 June 1848) resulted in the defeat of
the workers by the government forces led by General Louis
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Cavaignac after the bloodiest street fighting seen in
Europe. The intense violence made many middle class people
fearful of some of the liberal changes and led to a reaction
against many of the liberal reforms. In the aftermath of
the violence legislation was enacted to suppress radical
clubs and newspapers, and Cavaignac was given dictatorial
povers until a nev constitution and elections could be
held. It was these events that allowed Louis Napoleon
Bonaparte ITT to be elected president on 10 November 1848,
and eventually led to Bonaparte achieving dictatorial powers
through democratic procedures such as the plebiscite.
In Frussia, the National Assembly that had been elected
in May 1848 became involved in extensive debates between the
liberals who desired merely to obtain classic liberal
concessions such as increased political influence based on
manhood suffrage, and the radicals, who advocated stronger
social change. The radicals in the Frussian parliament
frustrated the liberal ministry of Ludolf Camphausen
,
although those who advocated social change never obtained
enough power to legislate changes. The inability of the
radicals to effect change resulted in the formation of
numerous clubs, and as economic conditions deteriorated,
tensions inside Berlin increased. On 14 June 1848, a clash
occurred between the Civic Guard and workers when the
workers seized arms from an armory. Although the violence
that followed does not compare with that of France during
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the June Days, the majority of the people feared social
upheaval, and thus opposed violence and disorder.
Shortly after the uprising, Camphausen resigned, and
Frederick William began to restore his authority. In
September the troops that the monarch had ordered withdrawn
from Berlin at the start of the revolution returned, and on
5 December 1848, the assembly was dissolved and a
constitution promulgated by royal decree. The constitution
decreed by Frederick William made significant liberal
concessions, and illustrates an important outcome of the
revolutions of 1848. The adoption of liberal principles by
conservative reactionaries, even though only in a limited
manner, served to undermine the legitimacy of conservative
rule throughout Europe and helped to contribute to the
breakdown in cooperation between the conservative powers in
the aftermath of the revolution.
The collapse of the revolution in Prussia had
significant implications for the remainder of Germany,
particularly in Frankfurt where representatives of the
Germanic states were drafting a constitution for a united
German Empire. In January of 1849, the new liberal
constitution for a united Germany had passed its first
reading in the Parliament, and on 28 March the imperial
crown was offered to Frederick William by a vote of 290 to
248. Frederick William refused the crown because
although he possessed nationalist feelings toward German
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unification, the crown was not given to him by the grace of
God but by the grace of "...master bakers and butchers." 22
His refusal of the crown meant that the initiative for a
new political framework for Germany passed to the individual
states, of which Austria and Prussia were dominant. Since
Prussia had already recovered from the revolution, and its
king had already demonstrated his interest in German
unification under Prussian leadership, Prussia assumed the
lead in moving towards German unification.
Before Prussia could attempt to unite German states,
however, the liberal revolutionaries in Germany who still
supported the Frankfurt constitution had to be defeated.
Frederick promised military support to any German prince who
required assistance. As a result, Prussian troops marched
into the Rhineland city of Elberfeld, the Bavarian
Palatinate, Baden and Dresden and defeated the
7 °revolutionaries. Order had been restored in Germany.
Kith order restored in Germany, Frederick William sought
to achieve German unity through his own designs. Prussia's
German policy was formulated by General Joseph Maria von
Radowitz, who conceptualized a German confederation with the
king of Prussia as its head. The emperor would be assisted
by a college of six princes and a two-chamber parliament,
but the Prussian king would have absolute veto power on all
legislation. This new German Empire would then be joined to
the Habsburg monarchy which would be under Austrian
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leadership. This larger federation would he governed by a
directory of four, of which two members would be Austrian.
This program was rejected by the Austrian Prince Felix von
Schwarzenberg , however, because a German empire under
Prussian leadership significantly altered the balance of
power in central Europe. Despite these objections, Prussia
implemented portions of its plan on 26 May 1849 when a draft
constitution for the German Confederation was accepted by
Prussia, Hanover and Saxony, as well as twenty-six lesser
German states. Although this was unacceptable to Austria,
the ongoing struggle against revolutionary forces in its own
empire, prevented Austria from opposing Prussia's diplomatic
advances in Germany. Once the revolutions were defeated,
however, Austria assumed a diplomatic offensive in Germany
to thwart Prussian designs.
The triumph of reactionary forces in the Austrian
Empire, although taking longer than the French and Prussian
reactions because of the nationalist revolutionary movements
in Bohemia, Hungary and Italy, was still successful and
followed a similar sequence of events. First, a breakdown
in unity amongst the revolutionaries occurred as large scale
political mobilization resulted in increased demands upon
the government that it was unable to meet. Second, class
conflict emerged between workers, who demanded social
reforms, and the middle class, who sought political reform.
When the working class began to represent a threat to the
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propertied middle class, the middle class became
increasingly alienated from the revolution. Third, as the
financial crises that helped to precipitate the crises
worsened during the revolution, the revolutionary leaders
realized that the restoration of order vas necessary to
bring about prosperity. The need to restore order resulted
in the revolutionaries relying more and more on the
conservative bureaucracies and armies, thereby allowing
reactionary forces to reassert themselves, often using the
force of nationalism to promote their cause.
In Vienna, the high point of the revolution was marked
by the flight of the Emperor Ferdinand and his family to
Innsbruck on 17 Kay 1848. Ferdinand's flight, however,
produced another heavy run on the banks and created
additional economic chaos in Vienna. What remained of the
government attempted to preserve security and order, but
attempts to dissolve the armed students that formed the
Academic Legion resulted in another spate of barricade
building. The students were joined by the workers, and as a
result the government felt compelled to grant additional
concessions, including the formation of a new Committee of
Security on 25 May. The Committee of Security
essentially controlled Vienna for the next several months.
The Committee of Security attempted to alleviate the
economic and social crises by adopting measures to provide
work or maintenance for the unemployed. As in Paris, this
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measure resulted in large numbers of unemployed workers
converging on the city from the outlying provinces, and
increased the threat of further social disorder. The middle
class became alarmed at the prospects of social revolution
as they had no desire to see the economic order overthrown,
while the peasants were merely concerned with securing the
9 f\
abolishment of their servitude.
Besides the increased divisions among the various
economic classes, divisions also began to develop among the
nationalist groupings in the empire. At the first Fan-Slav
Congress that convened in early June at Prague, the Czech
nationalist Francis Palacky called for the conversion of the
Habsburg empire into "...a federation of nations all
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enjoying equal rights." This led to clashes between
Czechs and Germans, and the heightened nationalist passions
resulted in a series of violent demonstrations as barricades
were erected throughout the city. During a demonstration on
12 June 1848 the wife of Prince Alfred Kindischgraetz , the
commander of the armed forces at Prague, was accidently shot
and killed. The death of his wife, coupled with the
increased chaos in the city, resulted in Windischgraetz
bringing in military reinforcements, and on 17 June
bombarding Prague. Shortly thereafter the revolutionary
movement in Bohemia was crushed, and a military dictatorship
was established.
] 31
The defeat of the revolutionaries at Prague was followed
by similar victories by Austrian forces in Italy.
Fadetzky's forces inflicted a crushing defeat on the
Piedmontese at Custozza from 23-25 July, and on 8 August he
entered Milan in triumph. On 9 August, Charles Albert
signed an armistice in which Piedmont pledged itself to no
longer support Lombardy-Venet i a . The conservative victories
were strongly appreciated by a large number of
Austro-Germans who had "...come to see the point of view
that the Italian insurgents must be crushed not only for the
sake of the Habsburg empire, but for the sake of all Germany
2 P • ...
as well." Heightened nationalism was becoming a driving
force in the multi-ethnic Habsburg empire.
Ey the summer of 1848, nationalism had become an
important force in determining the outcome of the
revolution. The Czechs, Hungarians, Italians, as well as
the Poles, aspired to destroy the dominant position the
Germans held in the empire while the Croats, Slovenes, Serbs
and Slovaks struggled to break free from the domination of
the Magyars. It was these nationalist divisions that the
conservative forces were able to exploit to their own
advantage to help turn back the revolutions of 1848.
In September of 1848, the Austrian court restored Josef
Jellachich as the governor of Croatia and sanctioned his
invasion of Hungary as a means to help defeat the Hungarian
29
separatist movement. The Hungarians were able to drive
Jellachich's forces out of Hungary on 3 October, however,
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and they then launched a counter-invasion of Austria. On 6
October, a German regiment vas dispatched from Vienna by
German nationalists vithin the government to reinforce
Jellachich. This led many of the radicals to take to the
streets to offer resistance, and angry crowds marched on the
Ministry of War building. One of the radicals then murdered
the war minister Count Theodor von Latour. On October 7 the
"50
Austrian court fled to Olmutz, but the violence of
October had turned many of the middle class against the
revolution
.
Kith Vienna in disarray, it may have been possible for
the Hungarian forces to capture the city, however, the
Hungarians were indecisive and failed to take aggressive
action. As a result, Jellachich's forces joined up with the
forces of Kindischgraetz and by 23 October had surrounded
the city. On 31 October Vienna was bombarded into
submission and martial law was imposed.
The defeat of the revolutionaries in Vienna was followed
by the formation of a new government under Prince Felix von
Schwarzenberg who was determined to put an end to the
revolution. Schwarzenberg persuaded the emperor Ferdinand
to abdicate in December 1848 in favor of his nephew, Francis
Joseph. Schwarzenberg, although a firm believer in the
restoration of autocratic rule, established a new cabinet
that included elements of both the upper middle class and
liberals as he realized that some change was necessary to
??prevent further revolution."
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As the conservative forces reasserted their hold over
most of the Habsburg Empire, the government was now able to
direct its energies to crushing the separatist movement in
Hungary. Although Windischgraetz achieved initial
victories, and occupied Budapest on 3 January 1849, the
Hungarians were able to successfully counterattack and push
the Austrians back to their own borders. The Austrians were
determined to crush the Hungarians, however, and as a result
the Austrians requested aid from Nicholas, the tsar of
Russia in June 1849. Nicholas provided Austria with 140,000
troops, and on August 9 the Hungarian forces were decisively
defeated at the battle of Temesvar. Kossuth realized that
further resistance was useless and fled to Turkey on 12
a -a
August . "
Kith the defeat of the Hungarians, Austria restored its
internal security and it now turned its attention to halting
the plan of Prussia's Frederick William to unite Germany
under Prussian leadership. By 1850 it became clear that if
Prussia continued with its plan for unification, war would
develop between Austria and Prussia. Under pressure from
both Austria and Russia, Prussia agreed to give up its plan
and signed a convention at Olmuetz in November 1850
reestablishing the old Germanic Confederation. Although
this returned the situation in Germany back to the status
quo, Olmuetz was a diplomatic defeat for Prussia, and is
referred to in Prussian history as the "humiliation of
134
Olmuetz." Thus at the end of 1850, resentments existed
betveen Austria and Prussia over German unification, with
important implications for the future.
E . SUMMARY
The revolutions of 1848 undermined the stability of the
international system not only in the short period of
revolutionary upheaval from 1848 to 1849, but also in the
long run as the revolutions released forces that vould
dominate Europe for a generation. Although the events of
1848 bear little resemblance to the French Revolution, the
forces that they released vere remarkably similar.
Just as during the French Revolutionary period, 1848
produced a period of tremendous elite instability.
Throughout Central Europe conservative and liberal elites
were faced with both internal and in some cases external
threats. Conservatives were unable to deal with the
economic, social and political discontent that precipitated
the revolutions, and therefore it is not at all surprising
that they were swept away by the advocates of liberal and
social reform. The liberals, however, were unable to
effectively handle the political mobilization that resulted
from the revolutions and produced competing demands which
led to divisions within the liberal movement. These
problems were compounded by the liberal failure to achieve
control over the largely conservative armies and with the
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result that the revolutionaries lay under the constant
threat of counter-revolution.
The conservative reaction that followed the revolutions
did not fully restore elite stability. Although all the
conservative regimes implemented nev means of repression and
the strength of the state increased dramatically,
conservatives nov realized that they could no longer ignore
the liberal demands of the masses unless they vere willing
to tolerate the constant threat of revolution. The
threatened emergence of the politics of mass society placed
the structure of conservative regimes in jeopardy.
According to Richard Rosecrance it was "...this atmosphere
of internal instability and uncertainty which gave rise to
the age of Realpol 1 1 lk . "~ "
1848 also resulted in a resurgence of nationalism
throughout Europe, although nov: it became an instrument of
the conservative reactionaries rather than the liberal
revolutionaries. This reactionary exploitation was possible
mainly because nationalism appealed to elements of all
classes while liberalism was essentially a middle class
it;
movement." Thus the conservatives had an effective tool
that could provide broad based support for their cause. The
force of nationalism in conservative hands, just as in the
hands of liberal revolutionaries, proved to be a destructive
force as nationalism eventually destroyed the ability of the
eastern powers to cooperate among themselves. Prussia and
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Austria would soon find themselves in a struggle over the
control of German}, thereby undermining the once solid
conservative eastern block. The use of nationalism by the
conservatives also undermined the legitimacy of conservative
elites, vhich was based upon dynastic principles, with
important repercussions for both the stability of the
conservative ruling elites and their ability to cooperate
among themselves .
A decline in the international perspective of the ruling
elites also emerged after the revolutions of 1848. The
challenge presented by liberalism and t><e politics of mass
society resulted in the conservative elites focusing on
internal reforms and the strengthening of the machinery of
the state. Conservative regimes were now more concerned
with defending themselves rather than defending conservatism
throughout Europe. Austria, Prussia and Russia (and England
and France as well) no longer worked effectively together to
secure acceptable outcomes as each of the powers sought to
preserve its own institutions even at the expense of its
previous allies."
The year 1848 also marked a return to conflicts at the
center of the European continent, again not only during the
brief period of revolutionary upheaval, but for the long
term as well. Unlike the end of the Napoleonic Era when the
Congress of Vienna resolved the major territorial disputes
and established a balance of power, no such congress
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occurred after the revolutions of 1848. As a result,
antagonisms remained among the powers over territories in
Germany, Austria and Italy - areas of great sensitivity and
where vital interests were involved. These unresolved
territorial issues, coupled with the inward focus of the
major powers and a resurgence of nationalism resulted in a
situation where the opportunities for frictions were many,
and eventually resulted in a series of continental conflicts
including the Italian war in 18 59, the war between Denmark
and Germany in 1864, the Austro-Frussi an Kar of ] 866 and the
France-Prussian Kar of 1870.
Although it may at first appear that the victory of the
conservative reactionaries after the revolutions of 1848
should have resulted in what Fouthas claimed was "the end of
the world" and that "subsequent events were the fruit of
different ideas", this was not entirely true. Although
after 1848, the ideological struggle between conservatism
and liberalism was not as strongly pursued at the
international level, ideology became a more powerful tool
domestically. Puling elites sought to increase their
legitimacy and ensure political demobilization through the
"...increasing use of formal political ideology whose basic
concepts and slogans were spread to even the remotest
communities by middle class intermediaries." Thus
nations such as France, Prussia and Austria increasingly
used ideology as a means to ensure their survival. In this
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sense ideology vas very important because when combined with
nationalism the two increased the power of the state
dramat ically
.
The increased power of the state, when combined with the
industrial modernization of the period, allowed states to
obtain increasingly more capable armed forces. The period
of relatively limited ends and means that existed from 1815
to 1848 was rapidly coming to a close, and in its place
would emerge what A. J. F. Taylor called "the struggle for
mastery in Europe" where not only the fate of the great
powers but that of the entire continent was to be decided.
Finally, 1848 marked the breakdown of the international
system. The principles that guided the diplomacy of 1815 to
1848 were no longer able to prevent conflict from emerging.
The relative solidarity of the eastern powers was shattered
by the struggle between Prussia and Austria over German
unity. A system designed to prevent liberalism from
creating revolutionary upheavals was no longer applicable in
dealing with a system where nationalism was now a driving
factor. A new system was necessary, but the statesmen of
the great powers were unable to transcend the limits of the
pre-existing diplomacy. It was not until Bismarck
established a system based on a series of alliances that an
operating international system would be restored. Thus,
while the revolutions of 1848 were brief in nature, they
unleashed forces that created instability in the
international system for a generation.
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VI. THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM AFTER THE REVOLUTIONS OF 1989
The French Revolution and the revolutions of 1848 both
resulted in the development of several critical factors that
had a destabilizing affect on the international system.
These factors included nationalism, a decline in
internationalist perspective, widely divergent ideological
vievs, policies that had unlimited ends and pursued vith
vastly expanded means, conflicts that erupted in the center
of Europe rather than in peripheral colonial areas,
instability within the ruling elites, and finally a
breakdown in the operation of the international system
brought on by key actors changing the rules of the game.
Although these factors were present during both
revolutionary periods, the differences in the level of
intensity of these factors helps to explain the level of
instability that developed in the international system.
Before assessing the presence of these factors following the
revolutions of 1989, it would be prudent to give a brief
description of each of these variables.
A. FACTORS CREATING INSTABILITY AFTER REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE
Although nationalism can be both productive and
counter-productive, during times of revolutionary change it
has tremendous destabilizing potential for the international
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system. The force of nationalism is particularly
destabilizing vhen it is used as a means of expanding a
nation's resource base and uniting a people to achieve a
goal. This unifying potential was particularly evident
following the French Revolution when a "nation in arms"
almost established hegemony over Europe. Unlike 1789,
nationalism in 1848 created instability through domestic
turmoil, particularly in the multi-ethnic Habsburg empire.
The domestic instability that developed in this central
European empire created a large power vacuum, which would
only eventually be filled by a resurgence of reactionary
forces. Tt is these two possibilities - the one of a state
rapidly mobilizing and expanding its resource base, and the
other of creating domestic turmoil through the dismantling
of an existing state, that makes nationalism a particularly
dangerous force in the emerging international system.
During past revolutionary periods there has similarly
been a marked decline in the internationalist outlook of the
ruling elites. During both the eighteenth century and the
Metternichean period (1815-1848), the monarchs of Europe
strongly believed that it was natural and right that five
great powers should exist on the European continent. This
belief was demonstrated through the concept of the balance
of power, which was designed to prevent one country from
establishing hegemony on the European continent. This
internationalist perspective was destroyed by Napoleon and
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the French vho were no longer concerned vith maintaining the
existing European order. By contrast, in 1848 and during
the reactionary period that followed, the decline of an
internationalist perspective was the result of domestic
crises and turmoil. Both liberal and conservative ruling
elites became more concerned with strengthening the position
of their own rule, although conservative elites were still
somewhat internationalist-oriented because they realized the
dangers that revolutionary periods posed to stability in
Europe. Still, the political cooperation that existed
between the powers during the Metternichean period was
substantially reduced as domestic turmoil and rising
nationalism produced states that were much more inward
looking. The decline of an internationalist perspective
that developed as the result of the revolutions of 1848 may
repeat itself today as many East European countries and the
Soviet Union face a period of domestic turmoil and
instabi 1 ity
.
The French Revolution also produced an international
system in which widely divergent ideological views developed
between France and the rest of the European powers. The
fundamental rights of man were directly opposed to the
European dynastic order, and produced a European system
similar to the one that existed during the wars of religion.
The existence of widely divergent ideological views
contributed greatly to the resulting violence of the
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Napoleonic Wars. In 1848, although the potential for the
emergence of widely divergent ideological views to develop
existed, the course of events prevented ideology from
becoming entrenched in the international system. This
smothering of nationalist ideology was the result of the
rapid change from conservative to liberal elites, and the
subsequent reversal. The holding in check of nationalist
ideology helps to explain why the aftermath of the
revolutions of 18^8 was considerably more peaceful than the
aftermath of the French Revolution. After 1848, however,
nationalist ideologies were directed inward as a means of
achieving domes-.ic legitimacy by the ruling elites and as a
result the strength of the state as an institution increased
dramatically. The increased strength of the state helped to
undermine the period of relatively limited diplomatic ends
and means of the Metternichean period.
The forces of nationalism and ideology helped to create a
diplomatic period characterized by policies that had expanded
ends pursued with vastly greater means. During the eighteenth
century, despite the violence of the wars of the Spanish and
Austrian Successions and the Seven Years' War, with the
exception of Prussia's annexation of Silesia, the geographic
composition of the great powers of Europe did not
drastically change, nor did the great powers attempt to
alter political boundaries radically. Although it is true
that there were deep seated hostilities between France and
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England and France and the Habsburg Empire, none of the
countries possessed the means to destroy another. As the
result of a widely divergent ideology and the appeal of
nationalism during the French Revolutionary period, however,
France ended up pursuing an unlimited policy of liberating
the peoples of Europe from alleged monarchical tyranny.
Unlike 1789, this phenomenon did not emerge in 1848 for two
primary reasons. First, France refused to support the
revolutionary movements throughout Europe for fears of a
return to the Napoleonic Wars. Without the support of
France, liberal elites found it extremely difficult to
triumph, especially in Italy. Second, the conservative
forces had learned well from the French Revolutionary period
and realized the dangers of revolutionary upheaval and the
mobilization of society. This perception of danger, after an
initial loss of confidence by the conservatives, resulted in
a more aggressive response than might otherwise have occurred
The location of conflict during times of revolutionary
change is also a source of instability for the international
system. During both the French and 1848 revolutionary
periods, conflict erupted in the center of both Europe and
the international system. Such conflict was particularly
destabilizing because of the wide range of powers affected
and the complexities entailed. Although colonial disputes
were often dangerous and violent, the risks of horizontal
escalation from instability on the periphery was
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substantially lower than the risks of horizontal escalation
from instabilities in the center of the European continent
where the great powers had more to lose.
The instability that develops amongst the ruling elites
during times of revolutionary upheaval also tends to
destabilize the international system. Both the French
revolutionaries and the monarchs of Europe soon viewed each
other as mortal enemies that had to be eliminated, and
therefore the likelihood of stability in Europe was greatly
decreased. Similarly, in 1848 both conservatives and
liberals viewed one another as threats to their rule with
resulting foreign intervention in domestic affairs. The
threat of foreign intervention to eliminate real or
perceived threats to the ruling elites placed the
international system in a state of flux and resulted in
significantly reducing the possibility of stability in
Europe. Additionally, the domestic turmoil that preceded
the revolutions and existed during them resulted in the
possibility that ruling elites would be overthrown by angry
mobs, a factor that added to this instability.
Finally, although the end result of all the above
factors, the breakdown of the operation of the international
system prevented the restoration of its stability. France's
hegemonic drive on the European continent, when coupled with
its rapidly expanding resources base, prevented the
eighteenth century balance of power system and associated
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diplomatic and military maneuvering from checking French
expansion. After 1848/ although the great powers still
attempted to meet periodically to address the problems of
Europe, as a result of the revolutions and a decline in
internationalist perspective, the effective functioning of
the European concert was drastically reduced. It was not
until Bismarck created his series of alliances that a
functioning "international system" would be restored. The
lack of an operational international system has generally
produced an unstable environment even in non-revolutionary
times as evidenced by the instabilities that emerged as the
result of the collapse of the League of Nations during the
interwar period and the ineffectiveness of the United
Nations in the early years following World War Two.
B. INSTABILITY IN THE POST 1989 INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
Numerous scholars suggest today that Europe, and the
world in general, are heading toward peace and stability.
The post 1989 international system, however, is showing signs
of the emergence of the elements of instability that have
characterized previous revolutionary periods. Although the
Hobbesian pessimism of many scholars who predict total chaos
and anarchy may be unfounded, in terms of the variables
previously identified it appears that the opportunities for
frictions to develop in the international system are greater
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than during the Cold War. This pessimism is at least
partially offset, however, by the possibility that the
strength of the destabilizing variables that have emerged
today are not as strong as those that have emerged from past
revolutionary periods.
1 . Gauging the Strength of Re-eiergina Nationalism
One of the immediate consequences of the revolutions
of 1989 has been the release of long repressed nationalist
passions inside the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe,
particularly in multi-ethnic Yugoslavia in the latter case.
Similarly, the unification of East and West Germany has
raised nev fears of a resurgent Germany using the principles
of the right to self-determination to regain territories
lost at the end of World War Two. Concerns have been
additionally raised that a united Germany will attempt to
establish economic hegemony on the European continent,
establishing a satellite system in Eastern Europe. Although
in the short run, nationalist conflicts are bound to erupt
in Eastern Europe, particularly in the Balkans and the
Soviet Union, the likelihood of nationalism resulting in a
large scale war is less likely today than in 1789, 1914 or
1939.
On the more optimistic side, Stephen Van Evera notes
that two primary developments in postwar Europe have
resulted in a dramatic decline in nationalist propoganda
,
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particularly in the West. The first has been the decline
of nationalist passions as the result of concerted efforts
by international agencies and educational institutions to
present more balanced historical perspectives. Before World
War Two, nations often depicted their hostile neighbors as
harsh, cruel and backward while portraying its own people as
kind, civilized and progressive. The result of this post
war effort was to create a single, shared version of
European history and reduce the possibility of
hyper-nationalism in the West.
The second optimistic factor contributing to the
weakening of nationalism has been the partial social
leveling of European societies, particularly by the
communists even though they too produced their own elites.
The popular discontent that emerged between the classes in
the European social order has declined dramatically since
World War Two, anr 1 with it the ability of European elites to
appeal to social groupings with nationalistic principles to
bolster their domestic position.
Although there is some truth to Van Evera's
reasoning and his conclusion that hyper-nationalism has been
largely eliminated in the West, the emerging nationalism in
the East may not be so easily overcome. The nationalistic
grievances between the East European peoples are the result
of deep seated historical disputes over national borders few
of which were resolved at Yalta or Potsdam. Additionally,
151
the decline of nationalist passions in the West was
paralleled by the increasing integration among the West
European countries making the re-emergence of nationalistic
passions less likely. In the East, the decline of
nationalist passions was the result of Soviet suppression.
Kith the removal of Soviet dominance, these long repressed
nationalist feelings have already reappeared. As a result,
nationalism in the East will still be a driving force,
particularly in Southeastern Europe. Although optimists
feel that the strength and stability of the Kest will help
to stabilize the East, the likely disintegration of
Yugoslavia and the possible disintegration of the Soviet
Union will serve to inflame nationalist passions, offsetting
the influence of the Kest.
Although the optimistic outlook about the decline of
nationalistic confrontation in Eastern Europe may be
unfounded, the optimistic belief that the unification of
East and Kest Germany will not result in the renewal of
German expansion appears more realistic. Besides the
moderating effect that a more balanced historical
perspective has had on Germany, the legacy of the first half
of the twentieth century has profoundly influenced the
political development of Germany. According to Thomas
Kielinger, the editor of Rheinischer Merkur , "Kith so much
of Germany's national fiber destroyed and morally degraded,
it was difficult to conceive of even a relaxed form of
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patr iotisrr; , the mildest form of national pride, ever
emerging as a force to be reckoned with. Given to
erudication and cerebral reflexes, Germans had well absorbed
the lesson of their appalling record during this century and
had, as a result, turned to peaceful ways of applying their
talent and irresistible urge to excel."
The German society of today is now firmly entrenched
in the Western liberal democratic tradition, and with the
exception of developing a leadership role in world economic
matters, Germany has consistently maintained a low profile
in world politics. Although there are those who are fearful
of Germany again seizing the initiative, these fears are
based on the experiences of Germany in the first half of
this century when Germany 's historical condition was
remarkably different. The circumstances that contributed to
the two world wars, and Germany's position within those
circumstances, are drastically different today. Thus a
resurgence of German nationalism like that which existed
from 1890 to 1945 is unlikely. As previously noted,
however, the historical circumstances surrounding the
nationalist conflicts in Eastern Europe have not been
altered, merely repressed, and therefore the outlook for
nationalism in Eastern Europe is much more pessimistic.
2. Gauging the Strength of Internationalist Outlook
One of the biggest questions that remains to be
answered following the revolutions of 1989 is whether or not
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the countries of Eastern Europe, and the world in general,
will develop a more internationalist outlook. In the short
terir, it appears that Eastern Europe will attempt to seek
greater integration with the West, particularly in the
economic sphere. This tendency has produced great optimism
from the proponents of economic liberalism, who believe that
enhanced economic interdependence will produce greater
stability ir: three primary ways.
First, economic liberals believe that states will
become more prosperous and that this prosperity will serve
to bolster peace. Second, economic interdependence will
compel states to cooperate with one another on economic
matters. Third, economic cooperation will lead to political
cooperation and a significant strengthening of the
internationalist perspective. The barriers established by
the Cold War to this liberal economic order have now been
removed, and as a result the liberals believe that a more
internationalist outlook will emerge.'
This optimistic assessment must be tempered,
however, by the past political realities of the Eastern
European situation. With the forced social, cultural and
economic separation from the West by the Soviet Union now
over, the Eastern European countries will seek to reclaim
their individual European identity. Although the transition
to adopting democratic institutions, private property, and a
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market type economy may be swift, the rise in living
standards to ones comparable to those in the West will not
be achieved in the short term. Although there may be
pockets of rapid economic grovth and prosperity, the
emerging economic relations between East and West may more
closely resemble that of North and South.
The optimism of the liberal economic perspective is
further reduced vhen one considers the role that security
issues have had in suppressing economic disputes between the
Western economic powers during the Cold War. In the past,
significant economic disputes arising between the United
States and its major allies were either repressed or
overcome by the hegemonic powers imposing a solution rather
than solving a problem through mutual agreement. This
situation was possible only because of the overriding
concern for security among the allies. With security
concerns substantially diminished, and the development of
nev systems of equal partners, the resolution of conflicts
that arise over economic policies will become more
difficult, because "...partners can only disagree."
Although interdependence can create mutual
vulnerabilities, these vulnerabilities will vary between
states. The less vulnerable states will have greater
bargaining power over the more dependent states, and may
therefore seek to obtain substantial concessions and
benefits. The disputes that arise from this situation will
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in all likelihood not be resolved easily. The economic
competition that is likely to replace the security and
military competition of the Cold War also is not likely to
produce states that are deeply concerned with the
international system, but rather with promoting economic
gain for their countries. The economic pie is still
expanding, but there are now more hungry mouths to feed at
the table. And finally, besides the economic problems that
may contribute to a decline in internationalist perspective,
the internal turmoil that has developed within the Soviet
Union and is likely to develop in the Eastern European
states as reforms take place, will redirect a substantial
portion of those states' energies invard.
Although the foregoing paints a dim picture for the
possibility of an internationalist outlook emerging,
pessimism is offset to a degree by the large number of
international organizations (mainly through the United
Nations) that are already established. Unlike the past
revolutionary periods previously discussed, political
leaders will not have to face the problem of establishing
institutions to facilitate international cooperation.
Organizations such as NATO, CSCE, and the EC could also be
altered to accommodate the emerging Eastern European
democracies, although this would require the western leaders
to transcend the previous limits of diplomacy. These
organizations could help contribute to developing an
internationalist outlook amongst the East Europeans.
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3- The Decline of Ideological Confrontation
Perhaps the single strongest factor that vill
contribute to a more peaceful and stable world is the
decline of ideological confrontation between nations that
existed during the Cold War. In the revolutionary periods
of 1789 and 1848, strong ideological divergence among the
great powers was closely paralleled by high levels of
vi olence
.
Stephen Van Evera argues that the expansion of
liberal democracy to Eastern Europe will promote a peaceful
7 .
world for two reasons. First, the ideologies of
democracies do not incorporate a claim to rule other
democracies, hence they have no ideological motives for
expansion against one another. Second, democratic elites
would have more difficulty legitimizing a war against
another democracy. Although the empirical evidence suggests
that relations among democracies are more peaceful than
relations among non-democratic states, this evidence is
tempered by the fact that the Western democracies have a
shared cultural and historical experience. This commonality
of outlook contributes to peace among these states.
The countries of Eastern Europe, in contrast, had more
culturally and historically diverse backgrounds, prior to
the presently disintegrating period of communist rule. Even
if liberal democratic movements succeed in Eastern Europe,
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the likelihood that relations between them will be as
peaceful as those of the West is questionable.
Although many of the East European countries are
moving in a democratic direction, making democracy work in
these countries for the first time will be a long and
difficult process. The establishment of political
legitimacy will be closely linked to economic success, and
because the transition to a market economy faces the
challenges of inflation, unemployment, shortages, strikes
and recession, the survival of new democratic institutions
and politicians will constantly be in peril. It is quite
possible that out of the rubble of the Eastern European
states, the political systems that emerge may more closely
resemble Fascist systems rather than liberal democratic
ones. It is not impossible that dictatorships could rise
through popular elections and mandates, similar to the rise
of Louis Napoleon in France following the revolution of
1848.
Despite the fact that the democratic institutions of
Eastern Europe are facing an uphill struggle to achieve
stability and ensure success, there is hope for the future.
Unlike the Cold War, where the West could only exert limited
pressures on the Warsaw Pact countries for political reform,
the fall of communism and the severance of Eastern Europe's
ties with the Soviet Union have placed these countries in a
position where large scale, rapid economic aid is required
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to rebuild these countries. Even though the West could not
supply all the capital required for recovery, any aid
provided could be linked to the adoption of liberal
democratic and economic reforms. This linkage could be used
to ensure the strengthening of democratic institutions
emerging in Eastern Europe and to help prevent the emergence
of widely divergent ideological views.
4. Prospects for the Return of Nationalist Mobilization
The resurgence of nationalist aspirations in Eastern
Europe has trought with it fears that this force will be
used to mobilize society to redress the long repressed
grievances that have existed between the peoples of Eastern
Europe. This mobilization could result in a situation like
that of the French Revolution, where unlimited ends were
pursued with vastly expanded means. Although this scenario
is unlikely to develop on a continental scale as in 1789,
this possibility should not be overlooked on a regional
basis, especially in the Balkans and in the Soviet Union.
During the Cold War, nationalist mobilization was
largely repressed through alliance structures which promoted
the use of professional armies relying on complex high
technology military equipment and nuclear weapons. With the
dismantling of the Warsaw Pact, the Eastern European
countries may exploit nationalist appeals to mobilize its
citizenry to maintain large standing armies and militias to
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settle various ethnic conflicts. This process is already
undervay in Yugoslavia as the republics of Serbia and
Croatia have mobilized and made var along nationalist lines.
Although the current situation in Yugoslavia leads
one to be concerned about nationalistic mobilization, this
appears to be a regional phenomenon. The countries of
Foland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary have already implemented
steps to decrease the size of their armed forces by 25 to 33
percent. In the Ealkans, hovever , besides Yugoslavia,
the countries of Romania and Bulgaria have maintained their
armed forces at old Karsav Pact levels.
Additionally, although the European states may
propagate nationalism to persuade their citizens to support
expanded defense expenditures, this pattern can be
effectively dampened by the West. The United States can
dampen security motives by maintaining a military presence
in Europe. A concerted effort by the Western European
powers to assist countries that are faced with armed
aggression, thereby rendering any mobilization useless as
well as prohibitively costly for the aggressor, would also
serve to dampen this type of nationalism.
5. A Return to Continental Conflict
Past revolutionary upheavals in Europe have been
particularly destabilizing because they occurred at the
center of the international system. Although it is true
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that the colonial and imperialist conflicts of the 18th and
19th centuries reverberated back to the European continent
and contributed to increased tensions, the event that alvays
embroiled the continent in war was an inter-European
conflict. The reason for this was mostly the close
proximity of the powers to one another and the fact that
gains made by one power at the expense of another in Europe
were perceived to fundamentally alter the balance of power.
This feeling was particularly strong among the English, who
went through great efforts to secure peace on the continent
in order to more effectively wage wars on the seas and in
distant colonial lands.
During the Cold Kar , both the Western and Eastern
allies sought to prevent conflict from erupting in the
center of Europe, realizing that any confrontation there
would be disastrous. Although vigorous propaganda and
covert operations were mounted to destabilize the opposing
states, there was a tacit understanding regarding the limits
of these efforts. The end of the Cold War and the
withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Eastern Europe, however,
has undermined and enfeebled the international system that
prevented conflicts from erupting in Europe. It is now
likely that Europe may once again become the center of armed
confrontation especially in the Balkans.
Besides the internal ethnic conflicts like those
that have produced the civil war in Yugoslavia and a
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situation at the time of this vriting where it appears that
only outside intervention will prevent a brutal repression
of the Croation secessionist movement, there are many
external disputes among the states. The conflicts between
nations are particularly dangerous because the majority of
these disputes are territorial disputes arising from ethnic
claims. Although the concept of human rights as it refers
to the problem of national minorities is becoming
increasingly accepted, the right to choose one's cultural
and geographical aree is not, nor will be in the near
future, a universally accepted right. This situation
will lead to increasing tensions between the Eastern
European countries, where a host of conflicts exist,
particularly in the Ealkans.
A dangerous present (1991) threat to stability in
Europe in general, is posed by the continuing disintegration
of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia borders on seven states and is
the heart of the Ealkans. Additionally, because Yugoslavia
is involved in a number of border and ethnic disputes with
its Balkan neighbors, instability in Yugoslavia could easily
spill over into other Balkan states.
The continuing disintegration of Yugoslavia is
likely to increase tensions between Albania and Yugoslavia.
Ethnic Albanians comprise 90 percent of Kosovo, an
autonomous province of Serbia. This large Albanian
population in Yugoslavia was the result of the London
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Conference of 191? which created the independent state of
Albania, but only included half the Albanian population.
The Serbian attitude is highly antagonistic towards both
the Albanians of Kosovo and the Albanian state, which Serbs
view as conspiring with Kosovo's Albanian majority to absorb
or annex the province. The antagonism developing
between these two countries over Kosovo will most likely
increase under the strong nationalist propaganda being
espoused by Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic.
Tensions similarly are increasing between Yugoslavia
and Bulgaria over the Macedonian question. Bulgaria claims
that the Slavic population of Macedonia, Yugoslavia's
southernmost republic, is ethnically and historically
Bulgarian, although Bulgaria denies any territorial
ambitions. This ambiguous stance has raised concerns about
Bulgaria's true intentions. Conversely, Bulgaria has
become concerned about an ethnic Macedonian nationalist
organization known as Tlinden, which has raised fears in
Bulgaria that a resurgent Macedonian nation would claim
parts of Bulgaria. The emergence of Ilinden has resulted in
many Bulgarians believing that the movement is Serbian
sponsored
.
The Macedonian issue is also raising concerns in
Greece, a state which has vigorously denied the existence of
a Macedonian nationality for fear that it may call into
question Greece's northern border. The refusal of Greece to
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recognize Macedonian nationality led to charges by
Yugoslavia that Greece is not protecting the rights of the
Macedonian minority in Greece. As a result, increased
border crossing disputes arose throughout 1990 as Greece
refused to allow individuals who were identified as
Macedonians on their passports to enter Greece for fear that
they may attempt to ferment anti-Greek sentiment. This
practice led to 50,000 Macedonians blockading several border
crossings between Yugoslavia and Greece in May of 1990.
Besides Yugoslavia, the Ealkan state of Romania is
also embroiled in a series of disputes with neighboring
states. Currently, Romania and Bulgaria are involved in a
series of disputes over the pollution of the Bulgarian town
of Fuse by Romanian industry in Guirgiu, an industrial
center across the Danube. Additionally, there is no
guarantee that the latent territorial dispute over the
Romanian territory of Dobrudja, which contains a large
Bulgarian minority will not re-emerge.
The Romanian-Hungarian dispute over the ethnic
Hungarians in Romanian Transylvania is another source of
conflict. The Treaty of Trianon in 1920 resulted in Hungary
ceding Transylvania to Romania, resulting in approximately 2
million Hungarians living in Romania. Hungary asserts that
these people are denied political and economic rights. This
dispute intensified in March 1990 when attacks upon
Hungarian minorities were provoked by the Romanian
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ultra-nationalist group Romanian Hearth. This conflict
is likely to deepen as the Hungarian Democratic Forum
continues to make the treatment of the Hungarian minority in
Romanian a major issue.
Romania also is involved in a dispute with the
Soviet Union over Bessarabia, which was incorporated into
the Soviet Moldavian Republic after World Kar Two. Although
it is unlikely that the Iliescu government will promote a
Romanian-Moldavian state, the ethnic clashes that resulted
in the deployment of Interior Ministry (MVD) troops to the
Moldavian Republic in October and November 1990, are likely
1 5to cont inue . "
The Balkan state of Bulgaria is also involved in a
dispute with Turkey. Currently, approximately 10 percent of
the Eulgarian population is comprised of ethnic Turks,
despite large scale expulsions in 1950-51, 1968 and 1989.
The Turks remaining in Eulgaria have subsequently been
subjected to a national assimilation policy, although the
Bulgarian government asserts that these people were ethnic
Bulgarians who had been compelled to become Turkish during
the Ottoman occupation, and now they are just being
"re-Bulgarianized . " Following the ouster of communist
leader Zhivkov in November 1989, however, the decision was
made to restore the rights and property of Turkish
minorities, leading to the return of ethnic Turks to
Bulgaria to reclaim their past occupations and property.
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This has led to increased tensions between Bulgarians and
Turks within Bulgaria, and any renewal of violence between
the two groups will heighten tensions between the two
1 7
countries .
Although the Balkans are clearly the "powder keg of
Europe", the potential for nationalist territorial disputes
is also present in other areas, particularly between Poland
and its Eastern and Western neighbors. Poland's frontiers
were radically altered at the end of the Second World War
when Poland lost large amounts of territory to the Soviet
Union while being compensated with former German territories
to the West. The 1989 Soviet census results show that over
1 million ethnic Poles are living in portions of
Byelorussia, the Ukraine and Lithuania, and this has fueled
Polish nationalist factions within Poland. Polish claims
have been met by both the Soviet Republic's and Lithuania's
own irredentist claims regarding their ethnic minorities in
Poland .
The number of Germans living in Poland, with
estimates ranging from 50,000 to 1 million, is also a
hot political issue as this number appears to be increasing
as many Poles seek association with Germany for economic
reasons. Although it is extremely unlikely that the
German-Polish border is going to become an issue after the
signing of the German-Polish bilateral treaty in November
1990 recognizing the Oder-Neisse boundary, the eventual
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growth of German influence in Western Poland can not be
discounted .
Although the possibility of conflict in Eastern
Europe is high, the likelihood of this conflict engulfing
the entire continent is low. The instability of the East is
offset by the unprecedented stability of the West. The
challenge for the West is therefore to promote and expand
this stability to Southeastern Europe. This is currently a
difficult problem since the mechanisms that ensured
stability on this portion of the continent during the Cold
War have been dismantled and no new mechanisms have yet been
put in their place.
6. Instability of the Ruling Elite
The political elites of Eastern Europe are likely to
face many of the same challenges that the liberal elites
faced in Europe following the revolutions of 1848. After
1848, widespread political mobilization created a situation
where diverse groups were able to make demands and seek
recognition of special interests. The developing political
factionalization prevented political cooperation among the
various liberal factions, and prevented a consensus from
being reached regarding solutions to the economic and social
crises that caused the revolution. This resulted in making
the economic and social crises that caused the revolutions
of 1848 substantially worse, and laid the foundation for the
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eventual conservative reaction as it became generally
accepted that the restoration of social order vas vital for
the restoration of prosperity.
The problem facing the liberal elites of 1989 is
similar to that of 1848. With no experience handling a
mobilized society, and no institutional means intact to
effectively manage competing interests, will the Eastern
European leaders be able to prevent a further decline in
their countries economy and prevent a possible conservative
reaction?
The domestic political problems facing the new
Eastern European leaders is compounded by the problems of
making a market economy function. Despite the difficulties
involved in achieving an effectively functioning democracy,
the transition to a market economy is likely to take much
longer. Although states like Hungary and Czechoslovakia may
have a reasonable chance at success based on their prewar
history, the chances of success for many of the Balkan
nations is substantially less. The probability of failure
of economic reforms in the Balkans is likely to create
further tensions in an area already unstable.
This pessimistic appraisal is offset, at least in
the short term, by the fact that the Eastern European
societies of today are not as sharply divided along class
lines as the societies of 1848, although new class
stratifications are already beginning to develop. The
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competing interests that emerged in 1848 were the result of
class conflicts as peasants/ workers, the middle class and
the nobility sought to improve their positions. The social
leveling imposed by communist rule, however, significantly
reduced the possibility of this type of conflict from
emerging at the outset of the revolutions of 1989. Social
stratification that is emerging today as a result of the
economic collapse in Eastern Europe which has devastated
many industries, and is a trend that is likely to continue.
Social class frictions may therefore develop as a
significant problem.
Some special interest political mobilization is also
likely to occur. Both the communist party bureaucracies and
the military organizations of Eastern Europe will attempt to
hold on to their own privileges at the expense of democratic
reforms. This is already becoming apparent in Romania,
Bulgaria and within the Serbian republic of Yugoslavia. The
way in which the Eastern European countries deal with the
entrenched bureaucracies will have a significant affect on
the future course of events in Eastern Europe.
7. The Breakdown of the International System
The end of the Cold War has resulted in the
breakdown of the international system. The tacit spheres of
influence and rules of the game have been eliminated, and no
new rules have yet been established. As a result, conflicts
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and disputes are left unregulated, risking the possibility
of escalation. Currently there are several competing views
regarding the establishment of a new international system,
each with its own merits.
One of the most widely debated proposals is for
European problems to be resolved through the
institutionalization of the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). This proposal has the benefit
of the Helsinki process of 1975 being closely linked with
human rights, one of the fundamental sources of instability
in Eastern Europe. The drawback of this plan is that it is
unlikely that any agreement would ever be reached between
many of the Eastern European countries, and therefore it is
more likely to resemble the United Nations General Assembly
where many issues are debated but few of critical importance
are resolved.
Another popular proposal is to incorporate the new
Eastern European democracies into the European Community
(EC). The EC is a strong, well developed European
institution with a good record of integrating less developed
states into the European economic system and promoting
political development. The European states are currently
divided, however, over the admission of the Eastern European
nations into the EC. France favors a policy of
strengthening the institutions of the EC in Western Europe
before allowing the access of Eastern European nations. The
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French fear that the sudden rush of East European nations
into the EC would undermine recent gains by creating greater
factionalization as more special interests become involved.
The Germans on the other hand favor a more rapid
integration, largely because they stand to benefit the most
as a result of their economic strength. The debate vithin
the European Community over the pace of integration will not
be resolved quickly, and therefore it is unlikely that an
international system can be restored through the EC.
The revamping of NATO into a collective security
organization is another proposal often cited as a means of
restoring stability in Europe. By extending NATO membership
to the East European countries and expanding NATO's security
guarantee to include protection from attack by member
states, NATO could provide a stabilizing influence on the
European continent. The drawback to this proposal is
twofold: first, many European countries (particularly in the
West) are reluctant to enter into this type of agreement
because of fears that they will become embroiled in the
ethnic problems of the East. Second, this type of NATO
expansion would have to include the Soviet Union to prevent
fanning the fires of a conservative reaction. The inclusion
of the Soviet Union, however, would not be warmly received
by the East European nations who have spent the past 45
years attempting to break free of Soviet dominance.
171
Although there are many problems facing the
reconstruction of the international system, these problems
are not nearly as great as those that followed past
revolutionary periods when the entire system had been
destroyed. Currently there are several functioning
institutions (NATO, CSCE, EC) that have the capability to
restore international order in Europe, although they must be
adapted to the changing environment. These changes are
going to be difficult, although not impossible. There is
reason for optimism for the future.
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VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The international system following the revolutionary
periods of 1789 and 1848 examined in this thesis were
characterized by instability. Although each revolution
followed a different course of events and was the result of
different conditions, the revolutions did appear to produce
some common factors that created instability in the
international system. Although more historical cases need
to be examined to determine the validity of these factors,
the following tentative uniformities appear to exist among
the revolutions examined.
First, each post-revolutionary environment has resulted
in an increase in nationalist passions. This has had a
destabilizing effect on the international system either
through rapidly expanding the resources available to the
ruling elites or threatening the dismemberment of
multi-ethnic empires and creating a large power vacuum in
the international system.
Second, nations have tended to become more inwardly
focused and have lost their internationalist perspective.
This is normally due to the need to restore domestic
stability, or in some cases, to the misperception that when
a major power is undergoing domestic instability, it drops
out of the international picture and therefore no longer
174
requires the attentions of the remaining powers. The loss
of internationalist perspective creates international
instability, because such a perspective is required to
maintain the system.
A third tentative uniformity is that revolutionary
events produce a heightened awareness of ideology, either
internationally or domestically. This awareness is a common
source of frictions at the international level when the
ideologies of the powers are in opposition. Ideology can
also create instability at the international level through
its domestic application, either by creating internal
instability due to its devisive effects on society, or by
increasing the power of the state as in 1848 and thereby
allowing the state to pursue more aggressive foreign
policies .
Fourth, instability of the ruling elite emerges as the
result of the combination of domestic instability and
external threats during revolutionary situations and it is
difficult to prevent this instability from spilling over
into the international system.
Fifth, major revolutionary periods in Europe have
resulted in conflict erupting in the center of the European
continent. This has had tremendous destabilizing
consequences because of the sensitivities involved as well
as its effects on the balance of power.
A sixth tentative uniformity is a breakdown in the
effective functioning of the international system. This is
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the result of the combination of the revolutionary actors
fundamentally altering the rules of the game while the
non-revolutionary actors continue to conduct diplomacy along
classis pre-revolutionary lines. Since the old rules no
longer apply, however, conflicts are left unregulated by the
international system.
Seventh, and finally, the combination of these factors
produces a period where the relatively more limited ends and
means of the previous diplomatic period are replaced by a
period of vastly greater ends pursued with vastly expanded
means as nations are willing to sacrifice the maintenance of
the international system for nationalist goals.
If the tentative uniformities that emerged from the past
revolutionary periods are developing today, the world is
becoming more filled with friction than during the Cold War.
Although the strength of these destabilizing forces has in
some cases been reduced, it does appear that all these
forces are present in the post 1989 international system.
First, nationalist passions are emerging in Eastern
Europe and are a grave source of concern. The heightened
nationalism of the Eastern European states is only partially
offset by the enhanced stability of Western Europe, and
therefore it appears that nationalism will again become a
driving force in Europe, particularly in the east.
Second, although the decline of an internationalist
perspective is countered by the unprecedented number of
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international institutions that facilitate international
cooperation and growing economic interdependence, these will
only be effective if the statesmen of the non-revolutionary
nations are able to break free from the constraints of their
preexisting diplomacy to cooperate with the revolutionary
nations
.
Third, the ideological clash that normally emerges
during revolutionary times is currently non-existent at the
international level, but appears to exist at the domestic
level in the revolutionary nations, adding to the
instability of the ruling elite. The possibility of
reactionary forces or the rise of fascist political systems
in Eastern Europe cannot be ruled out, however, and
therefore it is possible that an ideological clash could
still emerge at the international level.
Fourth, the deteriorating economic conditions of the
Eastern European countries are likely to increase the
instability of the ruling elite. Elite instability will
also be increased by the political mobilization that has
resulted from the liberal and democratic reforms and place
increased demands on political leaders that have litte
experience with democracy.
Fifth, concern exists because of the large number of
territorial and ethnic conflicts that are unresolved on the
European continent. Any unilateral attempts to redress
these grievances will most likely result in conflict because
of the sensitivities involved with territorial adjustments
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on the European continent. It appears that the return of
continental conflict mat be more likely than in the recent
past
.
Sixth, a new international system to regulate the
conflicts in Eastern Europe has not yet emerged, thus these
countries are left with the legacy of Yalta and Potsdam. In
the absence of a functioning system to regulate and resolve
disputes, the Eastern European states may resort to
unilateral action, with destabilizing consequences.
Seventh, and finally, the possibility of nationalist
mobilization to pursue aggressive military policies can
fortunately be offset by the advanced high technology
weaponry of the United States and Western Europe, however,
this is not likely to be helpful for the Balkans or the
Soviet Union, and therefore the emerging diplomatic period
in Eastern Europe is likely to be characterized by diplomacy
that pursues vastly greater ends with vastly expanded means.
Although much work is required to restore stability to
the international system, the reconstruction of the
international system is perhaps the most important action
which needs to be taken to restore order in Europe. Whether
or not this occurs is dependent on the United States and
Western Europe. Clearly the United States and Western
Europe must assume a leadership role in pursuing a general
post Cold War settlement in Europe. In the past, stability
in the international system has only been restored when a
concerted effort has been undertaken by the world's powers.
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